The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney by Birckhead, Tamar R.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 2 Article 2
4-3-2017
The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of
the Defense Attorney
Tamar R. Birckhead
Yale Law School, tamar.birckhead@yale.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C.L. Rev. 379 (2017),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol58/iss2/2
  379 
THE RACIALIZATION OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND THE ROLE OF THE  
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 381 
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL BIAS WITHIN JUVENILE JUSTICE .............................................. 394 
A. Wayward Youths of the Nineteenth Century ....................................................................... 395 
1. Evolution of the Concept of Race .................................................................................. 395 
2. Disparate Treatment Based on Race .............................................................................. 398 
B. Mid-Century Lads of Tender Years .................................................................................... 401 
1. Delinquency as Contagion ............................................................................................. 401 
2. The Expansion of Children’s Rights .............................................................................. 405 
C. 1990s “Superpredators” .................................................................................................... 408 
1. The Crime of Blackness ................................................................................................ 408 
2. Racialized Public Policy ................................................................................................ 411 
II. THE HARM OF RACIALIZATION ............................................................................................... 412 
A. Perpetuation of Negative Stereotypes ................................................................................ 413 
1. Children of Color ........................................................................................................... 413 
2. Risk Assessment ............................................................................................................ 416 
B. Race-Based Decision Making ............................................................................................ 418 
1. Inside the System ........................................................................................................... 418 
2. Outside the System ........................................................................................................ 420 
C. Relinquishment of Rights ................................................................................................... 424 
1. Interactions with the Police ........................................................................................... 424 
2. In Juvenile Court and School ......................................................................................... 426 
III. THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY ................................................................................ 428 
A. Zealous Representation vs. Social Costs ............................................................................ 431 
1. The Parameters of the Debate ........................................................................................ 431 
2. The Ethical Rules .......................................................................................................... 435 
B. Beyond the Ethical Rules ................................................................................................... 437 
1. The Juvenile Court Context ........................................................................................... 437 
2. Finding a Middle Ground .............................................................................................. 438 
C. Shifting the Paradigm ........................................................................................................ 446 
1. Strategies du Jour .......................................................................................................... 446 
2. Racial Diversification of Juvenile Court ........................................................................ 454 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 460 
 
  380 
THE RACIALIZATION OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND THE ROLE OF THE  
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD* 
Abstract: The existence of structural racism is not new. In fact, as the second 
decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, there is evidence of a na-
tional political openness to acknowledging the phenomenon. This Article 
seizes upon this openness as it seeks to provide a fuller understanding of how 
structural racism operates within a branch of the criminal justice system that is 
often overlooked—the juvenile justice system. The Article offers a definition 
of racialization that acknowledges its multi-dimensional and fluid nature and 
the ways it is perpetuated via juvenile court rhetoric, processing, and proce-
dure. It demonstrates how the racial bias that animates today’s juvenile justice 
system has deep echoes in its early history. The Article examines the harms of 
racialization and the impact of those harms on children charged with crimes, 
providing insight into how the construction of race operates within the system 
as well as how the system itself contributes to the construction of race. In turn, 
the Article shines a light on how young offenders, who are disproportionately 
children of color living in poverty, are perceived and understood within Amer-
ican society. The Article also explores the roles of the various actors within 
the system, focusing upon the juvenile defense attorney and the question of 
whether it is ethical to utilize racialized narratives during litigation, a discus-
sion that illustrates the tension between two very different models of criminal 
defense. It analyzes the rules of professional ethics that address the potential 
conflict between a lawyer’s duty to her client and adherence to her own moral 
code, and it explores a middle ground that takes into account the unique chal-
lenges of defending adolescents charged with crimes. The Article argues that 
the harms of racialization should be confronted in the context of broader strat-
egies for reform of the juvenile justice system. It considers the efficacy of im-
plicit bias training for police officers and other court actors and proposes im-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2017, Tamar R. Birckhead. All rights reserved. 
 * Martin R. Flug Visiting Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor of Law and 
Director of Clinical Programs, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law (on 
leave 2016–17) (tamar.birckhead@yale.edu). For their comments and suggestions, the author is 
grateful to Muneer Ahmad, Fiona Doherty, Barbara Fedders, James Forman, Doug Kysar, Holning 
Lau, Anika Singh Lemar, Tracey Meares, Jean Koh Peters, Kathryn Sabbeth, Kate Stith, Erika 
Wilson, Mike Wishnie, Gideon Yaffe, and the participants of a workshop at Yale Law School. 
Alexandra Davidson (UNC Law) and Hyun-Soo Lim (Yale Law School) provided excellent re-
search assistance. 
2017] Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Defense Attorney 381 
plementing practical safeguards that enable defense attorneys to inoculate 
against bias, rather than focus on the nearly impossible task of eradicating it. 
The Article concludes with a call to diversify the overwhelmingly white bench 
and bar in order to create a racially, and ethnically, heterogeneous court cul-
ture that emphasizes fair and impartial lawyering, no matter one’s role. 
Our society applies a presumption of dangerousness and guilt to young 
black men, and that’s what leads to wrongful arrests and wrongful con-
victions and wrongful death sentences, not just wrongful shootings. 
There’s no question that we have a long history of seeing people through 
this lens of racial difference. It’s a direct line from slavery to the treat-
ment of black suspects today, and we need to acknowledge the shame-
fulness of that history. 
—Jeffrey Toobin, The Legacy of Lynching, on Death Row (quoting Bry-
an Stevenson) 1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a common scenario: I am in juvenile court supervising a third-
year law student, she is giving a carefully-prepared argument on behalf of 
her young client at a hearing, and I hear the phrase that makes me cringe: 
“He’s a good kid, Your Honor.” It is not something that was in the draft that 
I reviewed the night before, but it seems to have flowed naturally from her. 
Alternatively, the student expresses the same sentiment but does it in the 
inverse: “Really, Your Honor, he’s not a bad kid.” At this, the judge barely 
raises his head and continues to scan the papers in the file in front of him. I 
look around, but no one else seems bothered. Then the prosecutor riffs on 
the characterization of the juvenile that the student has offered: “He may be 
a good kid, Judge, but his persistent violation of the law suggests other-
wise.” The judge looks up with a nearly imperceptible nod. The client’s par-
ent (typically a mother, as most children in juvenile court come from single 
parent families headed by women2) may echo the language when it is her 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Jeffrey Toobin, The Legacy of Lynching, on Death Row, NEW YORKER (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/22/bryan-stevenson-and-the-legacy-of-lynching 
[https://perma.cc/CP2P-65Q7] (quoting Bryan Stevenson). 
 2 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 76–
77 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) (discussing research that shows that being born and raised in a 
single-parent family has been associated with increased risk of delinquency and antisocial behav-
ior, but suggesting there is not necessarily a causal relationship between family structure and de-
linquency, as there are no differences in delinquency rates between children in single- and two-
parent homes within the same socioeconomic group); see also Stephen Demuth & Susan L. 
Brown, Family Structure, Family Processes, and Adolescent Delinquency: The Significance of 
Parental Absence Versus Parental Gender, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 58, 58, 61 (2004) (find-
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turn to speak, some insisting and some only reluctantly acknowledging, 
“Yes, he’s a good boy.” Meanwhile, the adolescent to whom the various 
adults in the courtroom are referring is silent. Almost always a child of col-
or,3 he or she is usually a teenager but sometimes much younger—ten or 
eleven-years-old or even as young as six-years-old, as one of our clients 
was last year.4 
If the juvenile courtroom were a stage and its inhabitants were charac-
ters in a drama, most of the adults would look the same from scene to sce-
ne—white judges5 in black robes and white lawyers6 in suits or skirts, all 
                                                                                                                           
ing that youths residing in single-parent homes have higher rates of delinquency than those living 
in families with two biological parents). 
 3 In regard to racial nomenclature, this Article uses several different terms to describe people 
with brown or black skin, including “Black,” “African-American,” and “Latino.” On occasion, for 
groups of nonwhite people labeled in a variety of ways, including people of Hispanic, Latino, or 
Spanish origin, Asian people, Black Americans or Americans of African descent, American Indian 
or Native American people, etc., this Article refers to “people of color.” The term “white” is used 
in its conventional sense, to mean non-Hispanic Caucasian. The author recognizes that these terms 
are imprecise and socially constructed but consider them sufficient for purposes of this Article. In 
addition the author has chosen to capitalize “Black” but not white or brown, because the author 
considers “Black” to constitute an ethnicity equivalent to African-American, Irish, or Chinese. For 
further commentary, see generally, Erika V. Hall et al., A Rose by Any Other Name? The Conse-
quences of Subtyping “African-Americans” from “Blacks,” 56 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
183 (2015) (finding that white people react more negatively when a person of color is identified as 
Black vs. African-American, and suggesting that the African-American racial label invokes a 
mental image of someone of a relatively higher social class than the Black racial label); Ben L. 
Martin, From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming, 106 POL. 
SCI. Q. 83 (1991) (discussing the ways in which naming can be a political exercise and the signifi-
cance for the African-American community of the shift in labels from the 1960s through the 
1980s); Judith N. Martin et al., Exploring Whiteness: A Study of Self Labels for White Americans, 
44 COMM. Q. 125 (1996) (finding that white Americans resist self-labeling by race, but that the 
label of “White” is preferred over “Anglo” and “WASP”). 
 4 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2016) (establishing that juvenile court jurisdiction be-
gins at age six and ends at age sixteen). There is ample data suggesting that the demonization of 
Black children begins as early as pre-school. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COL-
LECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 7 (2014) (finding that Black children represent 
18% of preschool enrollment, but 48% of those receiving more than one out-of-school suspen-
sion). 
 5 KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS: OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (Mar. 2011) (finding that 72% of the reported U.S. population are white); 
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence: National Database on Judicial Diversity in State 
Courts, AM. B. ASS’N (June 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd/display/national.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/V89M-N399] (finding that in state trial courts in the United States, which in-
cludes juvenile courts, 86% of the judges are white, 7% are African-American and 7% of the 
judges are another minority, such as Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic American, or Native Ameri-
can, making the judiciary disproportionately white); see also Malia Reddick et al., Racial and 
Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES’ J. 28, 28 (2009) (finding that 12.6% 
of the U.S. state court judges chosen since 2000, including both trial and appellate courts, were 
minorities); infra notes 424–433 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the fact 
that the legal profession is disproportionately white). 
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speaking the language of the state juvenile code, knowing when to rise and 
when to sit, and revealing little emotion from case to case. The children and 
families who enter the courtroom, however, might share the same race or 
ethnicity and the same low-income (or no-income) socioeconomic status, 
but the differences among them—subtle though they may be—would often 
predetermine the result. This includes differences in the clothes they wear, 
the words they say and how they say them, as well as their personal, family, 
educational, medical and court “histories,” and of course the immutable 
characteristics by which we all implicitly judge other people—shade or 
darkness of skin, gender expression, and shape or size.7 
For instance, consider these two clients we have represented in the 
University of North Carolina Youth Justice Clinic.8 The first, whom I will 
call Campbell, is a light-skinned Black fifteen-year-old who is small for his 
age, standing at five feet three inches tall and weighing ninety-five pounds. 
His hair is cut very close to his head, and he wears a blue button-down shirt 
and khaki pants to court. He and two other teenagers were charged with 
common law robbery,9 a serious felony, after taking an iPhone from another 
student at their high school. The allegations were that Campbell and one 
boy grabbed the student’s neck and hands, while the other teen went 
through the student’s pockets and took his phone. Then the three adoles-
cents ran in different directions, while the student whose iPhone was taken 
found the nearest teacher to report what had happened, describing Camp-
bell as “a short little kid.” After the student advocate negotiated with the 
prosecutor, the parties agreed that based on Campbell’s lack of a prior ju-
venile record and the fact that the two others involved in the offense were a 
couple of years older, the felony would be dismissed if he admitted to lar-
ceny, a misdemeanor.10 
At the dispositional hearing, Campbell made a positive impression on 
the judge. The youth was soft spoken and expressed regret when he made 
                                                                                                                           
 6 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016 NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2016) (finding that 88% 
of the lawyers in the United States, as of 2010, were white, making the legal profession dispropor-
tionately white). 
 7 See infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing implicit bias). 
 8 Names and other identifying information of clients and their families in addition to specific 
facts regarding their cases have been changed. See Supervisory Case Notes of Author (on file with 
author). 
 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.87-1 (2016) (classifying robbery as defined at common law as a felo-
ny); State v. Smith, 607 S.E.2d 607, 618 (N.C. 2005) (requiring, under the common law, that 
someone feloniously take and carry away another’s personal property by means of force or vio-
lence). 
 10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (requiring that the value of the items stolen is less than one thou-
sand dollars). 
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eye contact with the victim and readily apologized to him in open court.11 
Campbell told the judge about his interest in drawing and painting, and the 
judge asked him to bring in samples of his art on the next court date. 
Campbell’s mother, born in Trinidad, had straightened hair, muted lipstick, 
and wore a long floral skirt and wool sweater. She worked as a dental assis-
tant and had no prior court experience. I watched as she stood up proudly 
and in her light Caribbean accent told the judge, a middle-aged white 
woman, that her son behaved very well at home and that he “has the poten-
tial to be a very good boy.” The judge thanked her for her words and 
praised Campbell for taking responsibility for his actions. Although trou-
bled by Campbell’s recent in-school suspension and mediocre grades, the 
judge placed him on probation for six months with only a few conditions, 
including thirty hours of community service via a program that would pay 
restitution to the victim to replace his phone, which had not been recov-
ered.12 Upon leaving the courtroom that day, Campbell smiled and ap-
peared relieved. 
In contrast, another of our clients, whom I will call Raekwon,13 is a 
dark-skinned14 African-American fifteen-year-old charged with a serious 
felony: assault inflicting serious bodily injury.15 The case emanated from an 
altercation in his neighborhood with a seventeen-year-old youth in which 
Raekwon threw a hand weight, hitting the boy’s head, which subsequently 
required medical attention. Raekwon is tall and sturdy for his age, nearly 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the 
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of 
displays of remorse in juvenile court, the absence of which militates in favor of more punitive 
treatment); see also Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstruct-
ing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 310 & nn.46–49 
(1999) (citing relevant case law and discussing the ways in which remorse or its absence can bear 
on the criteria for transfer of youths from juvenile court to the criminal system). 
 12 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2506 (describing dispositional alternatives for delinquent juve-
niles). 
 13 Names and other identifying information of clients and their families as well as specific 
facts regarding their cases have been changed. See Supervisory Case Notes of Author (on file with 
author). 
 14 See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Introduction, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE 
MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 4–7 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) (examining the 
phenomenon of colorism that is practiced within Black communities, enabling the policing of 
Black identity); Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal 
Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 674 n.1, 676–77 (2004) (finding that Afrocentric features, 
including darker skin, a broader nose, and fuller lips, significantly correlate with harsher sentences 
after controlling for race, criminal history, and seriousness of the crime); Trina Jones, Shades of 
Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1497–99 (2000) (defining the concept of 
“colorism” or differential treatment based on skin color). 
 15 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32.4(a) (requiring bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 
death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, or other such conditions). 
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six feet and one-hundred eighty-five pounds. His hair is in short braids, and 
he wears his jeans hanging low on his hips, with the top portion of his boxer 
shorts visible. Although Raekwon denied any gang involvement and claimed 
that he had acted in self-defense, the police officer’s report alleged that the 
incident was “gang related,” the low-income housing complex where 
Raekwon lives is “high crime,” and Raekwon is “known to the officer.”16 
After the law student advocate persuaded the prosecutor that the nature of 
the injuries did not rise to the level required by the statute and emphasized 
that Raekwon had no prior record, the prosecutor offered Raekwon an ad-
mission to a “lesser included offense,”17 assault inflicting serious injury, 
which is a misdemeanor.18 After much discussion with the student advocate 
about how a bench trial would play out, including the fact that the alleged 
victim and the police officer would likely counter any self-defense claim, 
Raekwon agreed to admit to the misdemeanor. 
At the disposition hearing, things did not go well. Despite the student 
advocate’s insistence that Raekwon was not gang involved and that the in-
cident was not gang related, the same white female judge who had presided 
over Campbell’s case scoffed and threatened Raekwon with detention so the 
youth would see that she “wasn’t messing around.” Raekwon’s mother, a 
thin, tired looking African-American woman who had several children 
younger than Raekwon and recently lost her job, appeared dispirited and 
said very little.19 During the hearing, despite preparation and coaching 
from the student advocate, Raekwon nervously stood with his hands in his 
pockets and mumbled, not saying “ma’am” or “your honor” when answer-
ing the judge’s questions.20 When the judge asked him about a recent school 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing, in 
OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERI-
CAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 45 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) 
(finding that African-American youths are perceived to be more threatening and gang involved 
than white youths). 
 17 A lesser included offense is “a crime that is composed of some, but not all, of the elements 
of a more serious crime and that is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime.” Less-
er Included Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 18 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c)(1). 
 19 See Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1388–92 
(2013) (discussing the false stereotype that Black women fail to raise moral children and the strat-
egies Black women reformers have used to challenge the myth of the “delinquent Black mother”). 
 20 There is a rich literature on the importance of incorporating client perspectives and narra-
tives in litigation, something that may not have been sufficiently explored by the student advocate 
in this scenario. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in 
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 563–70 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of reconstruct-
ing case theory to more fully capture client perspectives); see also Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71, 76–
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suspension and below-average grades, Raekwon only shrugged his shoul-
ders. After being placed on probation for six months with numerous condi-
tions, including a six p.m. curfew for the first thirty days, drug testing, and 
participation in gang intervention program, Raekwon quickly pushed back 
his chair and left the courtroom. 
This Article is principally a diagnostic project. It contributes to the 
burgeoning literature examining structural racism in the juvenile justice sys-
tem and the effects of racialization on juvenile court decision making.21 
Although the standard dictionary definition of the term “racialization” is 
                                                                                                                           
99 (1996) (discussing how relationships of equality and collaboration between lawyers and clients 
can be created and sustained). 
 21 See Bishop, supra note 16, at 45 (providing an overview of the research finding that minor-
ity youths are more likely to be arrested, referred to court, and detained by police); Butler, supra 
note 19, at 1363–68 (discussing the way in which Blackness itself became synonymous with de-
linquency during the early development of the juvenile court and how race impacted the emerging 
jurisprudence on delinquency); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in 
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
383, 415–26, 443 (2013) (discussing the perception that normal adolescent conduct appears more 
dangerous in poor communities of color, that the denial of rehabilitative options to youth of color 
reflects explicit and implicit biases about their culpability and maturity, and that juvenile court 
prosecutors are vulnerable to racialized perceptions of aggressiveness, violence, and risk of dan-
gerousness in discretionary decision making); Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: 
Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 
1065–66 (2013) (examining how racial disparities develop despite the formally race-neutral pro-
cedures of the juvenile justice system, and proposing solutions to ensure that youths of color are 
not disproportionately sentenced to juvenile life without parole); Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, 
What to Do with the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: the Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Of-
fenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 
1327–31, 1340 (2000) (discussing the “get tough on crime” rhetoric of the 1990s and its impact on 
the passage of punitive juvenile justice legislation, and suggesting that the rhetoric about young, 
Black “thugs” may play a role in explaining disproportionate minority representation in the juve-
nile and criminal justice systems). See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) (discussing the disproportionate sanctions 
placed on minority juveniles and proposing an alternative model for youth crime control and child 
welfare); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUS-
TICE (2012) (discussing the negative implications of progressive juvenile justice reforms on Black 
youth). In addition, there is a robust body of legal scholarship that has explicitly explored the use 
of racialized narratives in other areas of legal practice, including immigration. See generally Keith 
Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Other-
ness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545 (2011) (explaining how immigration metaphors influence judi-
cial outcomes as well as social discourse and the broader debate over immigration reform); Eliza-
beth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. 
Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012) (exploring the narratives told about “good” 
and “bad” immigrants and the ways these narratives affect judicial exercises of discretion); Debo-
rah Weissman, The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality, 38 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 141 (2015) (examining the ways that Latin Americans in general and Mexi-
cans in particular have been subordinated through narratives that reinforce the depiction of the 
Mexican-as-criminal). 
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useful,22 for purposes of this Article racialization more specifically refers to 
the dynamic of racial formation that has animated the juvenile justice sys-
tem for centuries and that the system continues to reproduce.23 It refers not 
only to the linguistic codification of race-based24 stereotypes that influences 
the practices and decision making of the various players in the juvenile jus-
tice system—from judges and lawyers to police and probation officers—but 
also refers to narratives that court actors use to construct baseline norms, 
informed by white cultural norms, in order to distinguish the “good” kids 
from the “bad” ones. The process of racialization allows such epithets to 
serve as code for racially biased judgments of the young person rather than 
reflect an objective analysis of the relevant risk factors and demonstrated 
needs of an individual child.25 For instance, when a juvenile court probation 
officer describes an adolescent male as from a “broken home,” having a 
“negative peer group,” and living in a “bad” or “high crime” neighborhood, 
the odds are that the child is Black. When a prosecutor refers to an adoles-
cent female as someone who is “running the streets” and whose family has 
a “long history in the system,” these terms may also be racially coded.26 
                                                                                                                           
 22 The terms “racialization” and “to racialize” represent a concept used by social scientists to 
refer to differentiating or categorizing according to race, to impose a racial character or context 
upon something or someone, or to perceive or experience in racial terms. See Racialize, AMERI-
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016), available at http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/racialization [https://perma.cc/3DL7-Z9PU]. 
 23 See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 53–76 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the authors’ theory of racial 
formation, which emphasizes “the social nature of race, the absence of any essential racial charac-
teristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories, the conflictual character of 
race at both the ‘micro-’ and ‘macro-social’ levels, and the irreducible political aspect of racial 
dynamics”). 
 24 Although other minority groups, including Native American and Mexican children, have 
been subjected to a racialized juvenile justice system, the focus here is on the treatment of Black 
children. This is not to suggest that other minority groups in the juvenile justice system have not 
been harmed by the use of these narratives (or have been harmed to a lesser degree than Blacks), 
but rather to acknowledge the specific focus of this Article’s analysis. 
 25 See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Profes-
sional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1592 (2012) (proposing that prosecu-
tors “foster a destructive cultural dynamic when they use dehumanizing and racially coded lan-
guage to describe criminal defendants”); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Re-
minded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 66 (2014) (noting that federal crack cocaine legislation, which was 
enforced disproportionately based on race, was passed during a time of intense media coverage 
that used racially coded language). 
 26 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Girl Talk—Examining Racial & Gender Lines in Juvenile 
Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 1137, 1151, 1148–62 (2006) (discussing the history of the harsh treatment of 
Black girls in the juvenile justice system). In many ways, the system’s neglect and mistreatment of 
Black girls, who comprise nearly 30% of those who appear in juvenile court, has continued to this 
day. KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW ET AL., AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM & CTR. FOR INTER-
SECTIONALITY & SOC. POLICY STUDIES, BLACK GIRLS MATTER: PUSHED OUT, OVERPOLICED 
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Racialized rhetoric, however, is merely a visible signal of a more com-
plex phenomenon that perpetuates the introduction of race and racial bias 
into a formally race-neutral system. This phenomenon is not of recent vin-
tage but reflects attitudes and reinforces procedures that have been part of 
the fabric of the juvenile justice system for the past two hundred years.27 
Throughout the system’s evolution, race has been used to distinguish chil-
dren who have diminished culpability and a right to second-chances from 
those who are “superpredators” or “incorrigible, undeserving, and expenda-
ble.”28 In other words, notions of Black childhood have long been distorted 
such that African-American youths have few options that won’t reflexively 
be equated with immorality and/or criminality.29 This sort of line drawing 
can be particularly pernicious when decisions are based on multifactor bal-
ancing tests—the type found throughout a contemporary juvenile delin-
quency case.30 
This Article is the third in a series that explores and attempts to answer 
the question of why, given that adolescents commit criminal acts at the 
same rate regardless of race,31 the juvenile justice system is principally 
                                                                                                                           
AND UNDERPROTECTED 19–24 (2016) (evaluating the greater punitive disparity that Black female 
students face in public education compared to students of the same gender). 
 27 See WARD, supra note 21, at 33–38 (characterizing the juvenile justice agenda as a “long-
standing ‘racial project’” that has distorted the idea of Black childhood and undermined the claims 
of Black youths to citizenship); Butler, supra note 19, at 1358–63 (arguing that the juvenile 
court’s stated commitment to protecting and supporting children as they mature has always 
masked racial and socioeconomic biases). 
 28 WARD, supra note 21, at 14, 38. 
 29 Id. at 35. 
 30 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1903(b) (2016) (stating that the judge may order secure custody 
when she finds a “reasonable factual basis” to believe the juvenile committed the offense and that 
one or more of eight enumerated circumstances exist). 
 31 See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 725 (Jack R. Greene ed., 2007) (noting that 
almost all minors could be considered delinquents, because most engage in at least one illegal 
behavior at some time during their juvenile years); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 
2, at 73 (“Most adolescents in U.S. society at some time engage in illegal behaviors, whether some 
kind of theft, aggression, or status offense.”); Tonia L. Nicholls et al., The Assessment and Treat-
ment of Offenders and Inmates: Specific Populations, in INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND 
LAW 248, 250 (James R.P. Ogloff & Regina A. Schuller eds., 2001) (“Most adolescents engage in 
some antisocial and illegal behavior. Indeed, approximately 85 percent to 95 percent of adoles-
cents report having participated in at least one criminal act in the previous year.”); Van Jones, Are 
Blacks a Criminal Race? Surprising Statistics, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2005), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/van-jones/are-blacks-a-criminal-rac_b_8398.html [https://perma.cc/2KR2-
T5GL] (highlighting that African-American youth have lower or similar rates of drug abuse, pos-
session of weapons, and assault compared to those of whites); Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights & Leadership Conference Educ. Fund, Executive Summary to Justice on Trial: Racial 
Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, LEADERSHIP CONF. (Feb. 1, 2001), http://
www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160820152757/
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/] (remarking that even though drug use 
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composed of poor children of color.32 The first two articles focused on soci-
oeconomic status, examining the structural and institutional factors that 
combine to push a disproportionate number of low-income children and 
families into juvenile court.33 This Article expands the analysis by arguing 
that the process of racialization exacerbates this phenomenon, as it is harm-
ful both to the children who appear in these courtrooms, such as Campbell 
and Raekwon, and to the families and communities from which they come. 
When characterizations such as “good kid” and “bad kid” are racialized or 
when risk-assessment tools exacerbate racial disparities, the impact is harm-
ful. When decision making is characterized by malleable standards that in-
vite unchecked exercises of discretion, the impact is harmful.34 When chil-
dren of color must abandon their legal, privacy, or dignitary rights in order 
to be perceived as a “good Black”35 or to survive an interaction with a po-
                                                                                                                           
rates have been lower among black youths than white youths, arrests for minority juvenile crimes 
increased, and that “[s]imilar disparities appear in relation to non-drug-related crimes”). 
 32 See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (discussing the intersection between race 
and class and the ways in which juvenile court continues to be a forum for people living in pov-
erty). 
 33 See generally Tamar R. Birckhead, Closing the Widening Net: The Rights of Juveniles at 
Intake, 46 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 157 (2013) (examining the intake process, which operates as one 
of the primary gateways to juvenile court, resulting in a wider net being cast around minority and 
low-income children); Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 53 (2012) [hereinafter Birckhead, Delinquent] (exploring the causes of the dispropor-
tionate representation of low-income children in the juvenile justice system). For a related discus-
sion of the complicated ways in which class and privilege impact how people within the Black 
community think about and consider the era of mass incarceration, see generally James Forman, 
Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791 (2011). See 
James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 21, 52–58 (2012) (arguing that the impact of class and class differences within the African 
American community is often obscured when analogizing mass incarceration to Jim Crow). 
 34 See Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Eth-
ics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 98 (2011) (pointing out the “expansive discre-
tionary powers of judges in juvenile court”); see also Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, 
Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009) (suggesting that racial prejudice can affect discretionary judgments 
made in the juvenile justice system, as seen in Louisiana); Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids 
Anymore: A Need for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 
391, 396 (2001) (noting that the “informal nature of the juvenile justice system and the wide dis-
cretion given to juvenile court judges” was blamed for the failure of rehabilitation goals in the 
juvenile justice system). 
 35 DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-
RACIAL” AMERICA 16, 99–100 (2013) (arguing that the public views racial profiling as a problem 
only if it is used against “good Blacks” who are “innocent or respectable” African Americans who 
“don’t deserve” to be racially profiled); see also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 184–85 (discussing 
the process of subtyping by which group members who deviate from the group stereotype are 
considered an “exceptional” subset of the group and are given a more “favorable” label, such as 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s the “talented tenth” in the early 1900s or the “Black bourgeoisie” of the 1960s). 
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lice officer, the impact is harmful. In all of these ways, the racialization of 
juvenile justice is a symptom as well as a cause of the disproportionate rep-
resentation of African-American children in the system.36 
The two contrasting scenarios described above exemplify the multi-
dimensional and fluid nature of racialization. Although the offenses for 
which Campbell and Raekwon were charged were both serious, and alt-
hough the two young people received similar plea deals and dispositions, 
the court experiences could not have been more dissimilar. The juvenile 
court judge appeared to have made very different assumptions about the 
youths during each of the hearings, which was reflected in her tone of 
voice, body language, and the substance of what she conveyed. She made 
her decisions based, at least in part, on intra-racial distinctions. For in-
stance, both Campbell and his mother “worked their identities,” whether 
consciously or unconsciously, such that their appearances and behavior 
were “stereotype-negating,” particularly when contrasted with Raekwon.37 
Even the boys’ first names, one that sounds “white” (Campbell) and the 
other that sounds “Black” (Raekwon), provided the judge with information 
she could use to evaluate whether negative stereotypes about African-
Americans as a group should apply to them. All of these factors gave 
Campbell an advantage over Raekwon. Similarly, although both young men 
are Black, the fact that Campbell is physically slight with light brown skin 
and short hair may have been more racially palatable to the judge than 
Raekwon’s physical bulk, dark skin, and braids.38 Likewise, the fact that 
Campbell was well spoken and easily expressed remorse may have been 
more racially palatable than Raekwon’s behavior, which the judge could 
perceive as reticence.39 The judge could believe that Campbell’s seemingly 
friendly and cooperative demeanor should be encouraged because he ap-
pears to be less stereotypically Black, whereas Raekwon’s seemingly nega-
tive attitude should be chastised because he appears to be more stereotypi-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 35, at 99, 113 (discussing the preference for some 
Blacks over others). 
 37 See id. at 16 (discussing the concept of “working one’s identity” and the ways in which it 
represents a form of compromise by the one who engages in it); Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial 
Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1136–37 (2013) (providing examples of how people distin-
guish and stereotype along intraracial lines). 
 38 See infra notes 267–269 and accompanying text (discussing the “adultification” of Black 
youths, in which white people perceive Black children to be older than their actual age as a result 
of the dehumanization of Black children); see also Jones, supra note 14, at 1497–99 (discussing 
colorism). 
 39 See Bishop, supra note 16, at 45–47 (finding that youths of color are more likely to be 
perceived as hostile and uncooperative compared to whites, and that as a result, they are more 
likely to be arrested, charged with more serious offenses, referred to court, detained, and to suffer 
from race bias while in court). 
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cally Black.40 Similarly, the fact that Campbell has a Caribbean mother with 
a “respectable” job is, perhaps, less racially noteworthy than Raekwon’s 
African-American mother who is unemployed.41 The judge could believe 
that Campbell’s mother should be affirmed because she appears to be less 
stereotypically Black and more assimilationist, whereas Raekwon’s mother 
should be, at best, ignored and, at worst, castigated because she appears to 
be more stereotypically Black.42 In the end, Campbell left the hearing be-
lieving it had been fair and feeling hopeful, whereas Raekwon was dis-
traught and embarrassed—responses that are significant, as social science 
research has demonstrated that when juveniles believe they have been treat-
ed unfairly by the courts, which has been shown not to be dependent on the 
case’s outcome, they are more likely to recidivate.43 Although interracial 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See id. at 45 (summarizing research indicating that whites and minorities tend to be treated 
similarly when charged with serious crimes, but when the threat is less serious, extralegal fac-
tors—especially demeanor—influence decision making). 
 41 Intra-racial discrimination proliferates in the juvenile justice system, as it does in most 
settings in American culture, with judges and other court actors presuming, for instance, that Afri-
can-American Blacks are more likely to be associated with criminality than Blacks of other herit-
ages, such as those of Caribbean descent. See, e.g., BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, “WHY ARE ALL 
THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?” AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
RACE 70–71 (1997) (discussing research indicating that Black immigrants from the Caribbean 
distance themselves from African-Americans, “due in part to their belief that West Indians are 
viewed more positively by whites than those American Blacks whose family roots include the 
experience of U.S. slavery”); Leonard M. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough for You? The Stories of 
One Black Man and His Family’s Pursuit of the American Dream, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 97, 108–
09 (1996) (observing that Black Americans of Caribbean descent and African-Americans who do 
not fit into what whites perceive as the “Black” stereotype have been considered the “model mi-
nority” within the Black community); see also Baynes, supra, at 101–04 (observing that although 
race is a social construct, people in the African-American community are ostracized for not being 
“Black” if they are, inter alia, too light skinned, middle class, ambitious, highly educated, or were 
born outside the United States); Blair et al., supra note 14, at 678 (concluding that racial stereotyping 
in sentencing is “not a function of the racial category of the individual,” but rather “based on the 
facial appearance of offenders” related to Afrocentric features); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Look-
ing Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing 
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006) (discussing the association between stereotypically 
Black physical features and perceptions of criminality in the context of capital punishment); Wil-
liam T. Pizzi et al., Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 327, 330–31 (2005) (finding that defendants with “more pronounced Afrocentric fea-
tures tend to receive longer sentences” because of “discrimination . . . within racial categories”). 
 42 See Carbado, supra note 37, at 1135 (observing that Black people are judged not only based 
on the color of their skin but also on how Black, stereotypically or race-consciously, they are per-
ceived to be); see also Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and 
Rule of Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2089–91 (2005) (discussing the legal profession’s com-
mitment to the color blindness of lawyers and that when white lawyers (and judges) fail to exam-
ine the influence of their white identity on their lawyering, they merely reinforce the general ten-
dency of white people to avoid issues of race). 
 43 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 24–27 (1990) (finding that people obey the 
law when the rules and procedures are consistent with their personal values and attitudes, such that 
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discrimination may be easier to recognize, these scenarios illustrate the 
ways in which intra-racial discrimination can be equally harmful. 
In addition to serving a diagnostic purpose, this Article is prescriptive 
in that it re-envisions the role of the defense attorney within the juvenile 
justice system. It also considers the efficacy of various types of training in-
tended to reduce instances of racial bias among attorneys and law enforce-
ment and calls for diversification of the legal profession and related fields to 
create a racially- and ethnically-heterogeneous juvenile court culture. 
Yet, even with such advances, complications remain, particularly for 
the juvenile defense attorney. Recall the law student described earlier, the 
one who assured the judge that her young client was one of the “good” 
kids.44 What if using such a racialized label in the course of a defense attor-
ney’s advocacy is helpful to the case? What if the student knows that the 
judge before whom she is appearing consistently uses this phrase herself in 
a racially biased manner and that the judge is likely to concur that this client 
is one of the good kids? Assume that after the student and I, as her clinical 
supervisor, discuss the use of this rhetoric, she agrees that it is potentially 
damaging from a macro perspective but believes that it is also a particularly 
effective way to characterize her client. Is it ethical for an advocate to de-
ploy a strategy that benefits one client but has negative ramifications for the 
broader community? Imagine further that the student has several juvenile 
cases on the docket that morning but only refers to a white client as a “good 
kid,” whereas offering objective descriptions of the others, who are Black, 
but not an ultimate characterization relying on the binary concept of “good” 
and “bad.” Is it ethical to use a strategy that explicitly benefits one client 
but implicitly harms others? Professor Anthony Alfieri has explored similar 
questions in the context of high-profile criminal cases involving racial vio-
                                                                                                                           
when people are personally committed to obeying the law, they voluntarily assume the obligation 
to follow laws, irrespective of the risk of punishment); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN 
THE LAW 49–75, 141–51 (2002) (finding, based on a sample of interviews with Caucasian, Afri-
can-American, and Latino residents of two cities, that deference to legal authorities is shaped by 
procedural justice and trust in the motives of legal actors); Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal 
Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 231, 233 (2005) (finding that 
perceptions of fair treatment enhance children’s evaluations of the law, whereas unfair treatment 
triggers negative reactions, anger, and defiance of the law’s norms); Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed, 
and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 457, 470 (2007) (“The procedural justice perspective suggests that people will com-
ply with, and more strikingly, voluntarily defer to rules when they feel that the rules and authori-
ties . . . are following fair procedures . . . .”); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of 
Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1454, 1479–83 (2009) (discussing the 
causal connection between adolescents’ views of the legitimacy of the juvenile and criminal jus-
tice systems and their likelihood to recidivate). 
 44 See supra notes 2–20 and accompanying text. 
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lence, and he has condemned defense attorneys’ use of racialized narratives 
because of the harm inflicted upon the African-American community.45 In 
response, Professor Abbe Smith has argued that defendants and their law-
yers should always deploy whatever narratives serve clients’ best interests.46 
The debate, which has been discussed or at least referenced by other legal 
scholars,47 is instructive, although certainly not definitive. Enriched by con-
sideration of the ethical rules that address the potential conflict between a 
lawyer’s duty to her client and her own moral code, this Article explores a 
middle ground that takes into account the unique challenges of defending 
adolescents charged with crimes. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I establishes that the racial bias 
that animates today’s juvenile justice system has deep echoes in the sys-
tem’s early history.48 It describes the House of Refuge movement, begin-
ning in 1824 when Progressives built reformatories for the ostensible pur-
pose of providing discipline, moral guidance, and practical training for 
“wayward youths.” For many decades these institutions were open only to 
impoverished white and European immigrant youths, whereas African-
American youths were deemed undeserving of rehabilitation and incapable 
of assimilating into the dominant white American culture. Part I examines 
the shift from a juvenile court philosophy emphasizing individualized atten-
tion and indeterminate sentencing to a more punitive one characterized by 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1339–42 (1995). 
 46 Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: “Race-Conscious” Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1595–96 (1999). 
 47 For articles that explicitly reference the debate between Professors Alfieri and Smith, see, 
for example, Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
117, 122–23 (2003); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social 
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1272–73 & n.104 (2002); Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and 
Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 
686 & n.218; Aya Gruber, Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and Gender Justice, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 1571, 1597 n.152 (2013); John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: 
Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 207, 223 n.62 (2008); Cynthia 
Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 911, 958 n.292 (2007); David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My 
Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1459 n.124 (2008); Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases 
and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 24–25 & n.137 (2000); Marga-
ret Raymond, Criminal Defense Heroes, 13 WIDENER L.J. 167, 179 & n.41 (2003); Rebecca 
Sharpless, More Than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Ad-
vocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 383 & n.184 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based De-
fenses: The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739, 739–49, 739 n.2, 755 n.78 
(2002); For an article that addresses the general contours of the debate without necessarily refer-
encing the work of Professors Alfieri and Smith, see Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie 
from the Cookie Jar? The Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1643, 1651–52 (2000). 
 48 See infra notes 51–184 and accompanying text. 
394 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:379 
lengthy commitments to substandard facilities and increasing rates of trans-
fer to adult criminal court. Part I concludes with a discussion of the 1990s 
era of the “superpredator,” when politicians and the media exploited sensa-
tionalized predictions of a new “scourge of feral youths,” thereby racializ-
ing criminal justice policy. 
Part II argues that racialization stigmatizes and devalues youths of col-
or, causing immediate and enduring harm to young people and their families 
as well as the wider community.49 Racialized narratives and practices en-
trench negative stereotypes of Black criminality, sustaining a system that 
rewards those children who most closely conform to mainstream, or white, 
norms of acceptability and penalizes those who are unable or unwilling to 
conform to these norms. Part II analyses the ways in which each decision-
point of a juvenile case provides yet another opportunity for subjective 
race-based judgments to negatively impact the result. It closes with an ex-
amination of the ways in which racialized practices of police officers, juve-
nile court actors, and school personnel force children of color to choose be-
tween their rights—legal, privacy, and dignitary—and their safety or securi-
ty. 
Part III considers the role of the juvenile defender in perpetuating the 
use of racialized narratives within the court system.50 It explores whether 
the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation requires her to follow the rhetor-
ical approach that is most strategic for her young client, regardless of its 
impact on the broader community, or whether this contradicts professional 
ethics and a normative commitment to anti-subordination. Using the robust 
dialogue between Professors Anthony Alfieri and Abbe Smith as a baseline, 
Part III suggests that the perceived dichotomy between these two very dif-
ferent models of advocacy is a false one. It considers the strategies du jure 
directed at eradicating implicit racial bias and concludes that racial and eth-
nic integration of the juvenile court bench and bar provides the best hope 
for inoculating against it. 
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL BIAS WITHIN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
The structure and procedures of the juvenile justice system have 
changed over the decades, but the influence of racial bias has persisted. 
From the court’s earliest incarnation through the present, distinctions be-
tween and among children have been made through the lens of race. Wheth-
er children are referred to as “wayward youths” or “superpredators,” racial-
ized rhetoric has become a type of shorthand that helps entrench stereotypes 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See infra notes 185–269 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 270–449 and accompanying text. 
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of Black criminality and perpetuate racialized practices in juvenile court. 
Although facially race-neutral ones have replaced overt policies of discrim-
ination such as segregation, the construction of race continues to animate 
the juvenile court system, and the system continues to construct conceptions 
of race. This Part examines these trends as to provide context for Part II’s 
analysis of racialization’s harms. 
A. Wayward Youths of the Nineteenth Century 
1. Evolution of the Concept of Race 
During colonial times, child discipline was left to the family, making a 
formal system of laws governing youthful misconduct unnecessary.51 From 
1790 to 1830, the northeastern cities of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia 
dramatically grew in size, and young people flocked to them from rural are-
as, seeking out newly created industrial jobs.52 Many of these youths came 
alone, without their parents, and did not attend school.53 Simultaneously, 
large numbers of European immigrants, many from Germany and Ireland, 
were flooding these same urban areas.54 Some immigrant children were left 
orphaned after their parents died on the journey to America, whereas others 
were left unsupervised when their parents joined the ranks of factory work-
ers in mechanized industries.55 As a result, large numbers of children ended 
up fending for themselves, and juvenile delinquency56 and dependency57 
were labeled “serious social problems.”58 
Organizations that ran child welfare institutions made classifications 
among groups of white immigrants and their children, using the ambiguous 
concept of “race” to determine which immigrants were “fit for self-govern-
ment” in the emerging American republic.59 This practice, in which the at-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Gayle Olson-Raymer, The Role of the Federal Government in Juvenile Delinquency 
Prevention: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 578, 582 
(1983). 
 52 See Priscilla Ferguson Clement, The Incorrigible Child: Juvenile Delinquency in the United 
States from the 17th Through the 19th Centuries, in 2 HISTORY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON CRIME COMMITTED BY YOUNG OFFENDERS, IN HISTORY AND IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 453, 458 (Albert G. Hess & Priscilla F. Clement eds., 1993) (finding that 
Philadelphia tripled in size and New York grew six-fold between 1790 and 1830). 
 53 See id. at 450. 
 54 Id. at 458. 
 55 Id. at 458–59. 
 56 See Juvenile Delinquency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 57 See Dependent Child, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 58 Clement, supra note 52, at 458; WARD, supra note 21, at 24–25. 
 59 David S. Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion: The First Juvenile Court and the Problem of 
Difference in the Early Twentieth Century, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra note 16, at 
105, 109–10. 
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tainment of citizenship was a racial project, reflected what was happening 
more broadly in the country.60 From the 1840s through the 1920s, 
“[A]mericans used ‘race’ not only to distinguish between ‘white’ and 
‘nonwhite’” people, but “to classify the various ‘white’ races, including 
“Anglo-Saxons, Celts, Hebrews, Iberics, Latins, Mediterraneans, Slavs, and 
Teutons.”61 
By 1820, public concern in the cities about growing poverty, increasing 
crime, and the “wretched state” of young people prompted the establishment 
of the first Houses of Refuge and residential reform schools—public institu-
tions that provided a structured setting in a wholesome “family-style” envi-
ronment.62 Child advocates recognized that young people who were impris-
oned with adults in overcrowded institutions learned only how to become 
better criminals.63 One reformer, John Griscom, visited juvenile facilities in 
Europe and was determined to replicate them in New York.64 As a result of 
his efforts, in 1824 the New York legislature granted authority to the Socie-
ty for the Prevention of Pauperism—renamed the Society for the Refor-
mation of Juvenile Delinquents—to build the first House of Refuge for 
youths in the United States.65 Within five years, Houses of Refuge had also 
been established in Boston and Philadelphia.66 Their formal objective was 
to provide “wayward youth” with “practical training, discipline, and moral 
guidance.”67 
The legal justification for the development of Houses of Refuge was 
grounded in the doctrine of parens patriae, which envisioned the state as 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. (describing W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1899 study on how Americans used race to structure 
citizenship). 
 61 Id.; JULIAN B. CARTER, THE HEART OF WHITENESS: NORMAL SEXUALITY AND RACE IN 
AMERICA, 1880–1940, at 33 (2007) (explaining that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, “[w]hiteness was fractured into many races—for instance, Celtic, Teutonic, and Medi-
terranean . . . [and] their positions in relation to that larger racial category were not identical”); see 
also MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS 
AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 39–90 (1999) (highlighting the racial refinement from white to “An-
glo-Saxon” that began in the 1840s in order to treat the Irish and other white races differently); 
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 62 Clement, supra note 52, at 459; WARD, supra note 21, at 52; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 
26, at 1148–50. The terms House of Refuge, reformatory, and residential reform schools are used 
here interchangeably. 
 63 Clement, supra note 52, at 460. 
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 65 Id.; Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 
72 MD. L. REV. 607, 616–17 (2013) (discussing the history of the origins of the juvenile justice 
system). 
 66 Clement, supra note 52, at 460. 
 67 WARD, supra note 21, at 52. 
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the “parent of the nation” that could exercise control in loco parentis when 
family members refused or were deemed incapable.68 This concept provided 
a framework for the government to unilaterally address the “seemingly in-
terdependent social problems of child neglect,” delinquency, and adolescent 
misbehavior.69 In this way, Houses of Refuge, and later the juvenile court 
system, became an effective means of providing social welfare as well as 
attaining social control over ethnic and racial minorities.70 
 The middle-class reformers who ran Houses of Refuge made few dis-
tinctions between children who were paupers and those who had committed 
minor crimes.71 For the proponents of the movement, living in a state of 
poverty and committing a criminal offense were virtually synonymous be-
cause both conditions were conceived of in strictly moral terms.72 Reform-
ers believed that immorality caused poverty and that the poor, as a result of 
their economic status, posed a threat to society.73 As stated by legal histori-
an Sanford Fox: “Unattended pauperism was thought to ripen into crimi-
nality, and uncontrolled criminality—particularly vagrancy, beggary, and 
minor thefts—swelled the ranks of paupers who had to be supported in pub-
lic institutions.”74 
 By the late nineteenth century there were more adolescents in reforma-
tories as a result of poverty or status offenses such as begging, cheating, and 
swearing than those convicted of crimes, with the justification that these 
youths were potential criminals in need of supervision.75 In this way, the 
House of Refuge movement, which sanctioned the punishment of children 
who deviated from the norm, was driven by a “punitive, reactive ideology” 
borrowed straight from the colonists.76 
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 72 Fox, supra note 71, at 1199. 
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development of Houses of Refuge). 
 74 Fox, supra note 71, at 1199. 
 75 Clement, supra note 52, at 482. 
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2. Disparate Treatment Based on Race 
In addition to providing moral instruction, Houses of Refuge had an-
other critical objective: to “Americanize” the children of European immi-
grants considered worthy of rehabilitative intervention but not the children 
of slaves or other non-whites, who had been “rendered unsalvageable and 
undeserving” of these citizen-building ideals.77 For many years, these insti-
tutions were open exclusively to white immigrant children, prioritizing their 
rehabilitation over that of Blacks and other youths of color.78 Black youths 
were considered “less suitable” for these reformatories not only because of 
a lack of confidence in their rehabilitative potential but also due to the ever-
present “specter of racial commingling.”79 Instead, Black children, both free 
and slaves, were either handled informally by plantation owners and local 
sheriffs, placed in apprenticeship or “binding out” programs, or committed 
to facilities for adults, from almshouses and work-houses to jails and pris-
ons.80 In fact, by 1850 a disproportionate number of Black youths were 
jailed in cities with majority white populations.81 
Disparate treatment of youths of color persisted in Houses of Refuge 
through the second half of the nineteenth century. Most reformatories were 
built during this period, largely in response to an upsurge in juvenile crime, 
which was attributed at least in part to a lack of jobs for youths who were 
being replaced by more reliable adult workers during the later stages of in-
dustrialization.82 White boys populated these institutions, with white girls 
admitted to do the housekeeping chores, including cooking, cleaning, and 
sewing.83 In the Northeast, a few reformatories were constructed for Black 
youths, but the focus of these institutions was not to provide education and 
                                                                                                                           
 77 WARD, supra note 21, at 33, 52, 87, 238. 
 78 Id. at 3 (“White adults controlled juvenile justice systems, and those systems were typically 
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 82 Clement, supra note 52, at 461. 
 83 WARD, supra note 21, at 52. 
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training for future farmers and skilled artisans but to prepare them for man-
ual labor and servile positions, offering minimal academic instruction.84 
Furthermore, although white children were generally placed in Houses of 
Refuge on a temporary basis, Black children often found themselves com-
mitted indefinitely.85 
It took until 1873 for a southern state to open a single reformatory that 
admitted Black children.86 By the 1890s, Black reformers in the rural South 
began to create and maintain their own juvenile facilities, but their subordi-
nate social position, limited resources, and lack of access to government 
officials meant that they achieved only modest success.87 The prison system 
continued to place most delinquent and dependent “colored children” in 
existing penal institutions intended for adults.88 Black children across the 
United States were also subjected to brutal violence in the form of whipping 
and lynching as well as the exploitative convict-lease system and chain 
gangs.89 
Whether the criminal courts treated Black children differently than 
whites prior to the establishment of the first juvenile court is difficult to 
conclusively demonstrate; there is, however, an oft-cited analysis90 that may 
serve as a relevant data point. In 1969, sociologist Anthony Platt looked 
closely at fourteen appellate decisions issued between 1806 and 1882, 
which represented all of the appellate cases during that period that ad-
dressed the criminal responsibility of children, and he found evidence of 
disparate treatment based on race.91 Within this group of criminal court cas-
es, of the ten children who were ultimately acquitted based on criminal in-
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capacity, nine were white, including four who were charged with murder, 
and one was Black.92 Of the four children whose convictions were affirmed 
on appeal, two were white and two were Black.93 One of these white chil-
dren received an unreported sentence, the other white child was sentenced 
to three years in a juvenile reformatory, and the remaining two Black 
boys—a ten year old and a twelve year old who were both convicted of kill-
ing whites—were each sentenced to death and executed following unsuc-
cessful appeals.94 This arguably representative group of cases suggests that 
the racialization of juvenile social control existed even before the estab-
lishment of specialized forums for youths.95 As Platt has explained: 
[These cases] suggest that the criminal law recognized that chil-
dren under fourteen years old were not to be held as responsible 
for their actions as adults. [Yet,] Black children apparently were 
not granted the same immunities as white children and it seems 
unlikely that [the two Black youths] would have been executed if 
they had been white.96 
Other data confirms that once juvenile courts were established, there 
was an overrepresentation of Black youths who received punitive sanctions 
and an underrepresentation of those who received rehabilitative services.97 
In the first U.S. juvenile court, founded in Chicago in 1899, white and 
Black youths committed the same types of offenses, but the court commit-
ted Black boys to the state-run reformatory for delinquent offenders, St. 
Charles School for Boys, “sooner than it would have in the cases of Jewish, 
Italian, or Polish children.”98 As a result, the “benevolent” juvenile court 
became a system in which orphaned Black boys who had committed no 
crimes were treated like serious offenders, whereas white immigrant children 
who had committed minor crimes were sent to institutions for orphaned chil-
dren.99 This development was in keeping with the early and sustained crimi-
nalization of Blackness that has long persisted in the justice system.100 
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B. Mid-Century Lads of Tender Years 
1. Delinquency as Contagion 
From the 1920s through the 1940s, there was an influx of more than 
one million Blacks and migrating to Midwestern and northern cities to es-
cape Jim Crow laws and the convict leasing system.101 These changing ur-
ban demographics caused increasing numbers of Black youths to come into 
contact with the juvenile court system. As a result, children of color contin-
ued to be disproportionately represented in juvenile courts across the United 
States well into the 1950s and 1960s.102 
One of the first national studies of its kind, conducted in the 1940s by 
researcher Mary Huff Diggs, surveyed fifty-three juvenile courts located 
throughout the country and found a larger proportion of delinquency cases 
for “Negro children” than their proportion in the general population.103 
Diggs attributed this imbalance not to the default assumption of innate 
Black criminality but to a lack of community resources for Black children 
and the fact that minority groups were exposed to “features of community 
life that are the least desirable.”104 Further, although probation was intended 
to be the disposition of first resort for juvenile offenders and commitment to 
juvenile institutions the disposition of last resort, this philosophy apparently 
did not apply to Black youths.105 As a result of her research, Diggs conclud-
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ed that there were in essence two different juvenile justice systems operat-
ing under the guise of one: Black youths entered the system at younger ages 
than whites, their cases were less frequently dismissed, and they were more 
likely to be committed to institutions.106 Although liberal Black professional 
leaders advocated for Black children to have equal access to the resources 
and publicly funded facilities of the juvenile court system, there was signif-
icant and sustained resistance.107 Black children were left to rely on private 
institutions for rehabilitative services, but even some church-run programs 
for delinquent youths refused to integrate.108 
For more than a decade after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education,109 white authorities continued to insist that 
court-ordered integration did not apply to juvenile justice administration.110 
Illustrating the extent of the opposition, juvenile court judges adjudicated 
teenage Black civil rights activists as delinquents and committed them to 
juvenile institutions, whereas similarly situated young white activists re-
ceived no punishment.111 Several states maintained segregated juvenile fa-
cilities through the 1960s and into the 1970s.112 A class-action lawsuit filed 
in 1960 by Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg seeking declaratory re-
lief from Maryland’s racial segregation policies in their juvenile institutions 
and the passage of the 1965 Civil Rights Act forced the gradual integration 
of Southern reformatories.113 
Similar to the way in which concern for the “wayward child” was re-
served for white working-class and immigrant youths during the nineteenth 
century, growing concern during the 1950s about the purported rise of de-
linquency114 did not extend to children in the Black community. Instead, 
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national groups such as the American Association of University Women and 
the National Congress of Parents and Teachers perpetuated the claim that 
“our children” were vulnerable to a phenomenon spread by “other people’s 
children” from “the wrong side of the tracks.”115 This fear was premised on 
the idea that modern mass culture—the portrayals of violence and crime 
featured in radio programs, movies, and comic books—caused delinquen-
cy.116 Vocal segments of the public clamored for government action, and in 
1953, the U.S. Senate initiated hearings on juvenile delinquency that lasted 
in various forms for more than a decade.117 Other organizations followed suit, 
such as the American Bar Association (“ABA”), which designated a special 
section to examine the relationship between mass media and delinquency.118 
The growing hysteria over the “social decay” caused by delinquency 
was promoted during this time by no less controversial a figure than J. Edgar 
Hoover. In the same spirit that he cultivated postwar fear of communism, 
Hoover cast delinquency as another form of subversion and called for a re-
newed commitment to the institutions of family, home, and church.119 A letter 
written in 1954 by “a busy mother” illustrates the degree to which the pub-
lic envisioned delinquent culture as a toxic force that could contaminate 
their homes: “We are a respectable middle class family, residing in a good 
neighborhood, but there is an ever increasing amount of delinquency among 
the young here. . . . [I] think and pray things will turn out all right for our 
children in spite of the bad outside influences.”120 Similarly, the following 
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year, Senator Robert Hendrickson of New Jersey explicitly compared 
Communism to juvenile delinquency, invoking images of infection, “Not 
even the Communist conspiracy could devise a more effective way to demor-
alize, disrupt, confuse, and destroy our future citizens than apathy on the part 
of adult Americans to the scourge known as Juvenile Delinquency.”121 
The view of delinquency as a form of contagion persisted during the 
1950s and into the 1960s.122 It provided the perfect metaphor to justify us-
ing the state’s parens patriae authority to “fix” juvenile delinquents without 
providing them with procedural safeguards.123 The first national law aimed 
at juvenile delinquency, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Of-
fenses Act of 1961, established that the solution to the nation’s youth crime 
problems lay in “developing techniques for . . . prevention and control” ra-
ther than promoting justice and due process.124 The Act’s emphasis upon the 
punitive orientation of the system was a direct repudiation of the philosophy 
of the juvenile court’s founders. Among the Act’s findings was that delin-
quency offenses disproportionately occurred among a very specific popula-
tion: school dropouts, unemployed youths, and youths in “deprived family 
situations.”125 These were categories that most white middle-class Ameri-
cans would associate with racial and ethnic minority groups—with “them” 
rather than “us.” 
During the 1960s, public dissatisfaction with the juvenile courts grew. 
The promise of confidentiality of records and processes had become more 
rhetoric than reality, and juvenile delinquents were responsible for more 
than 20% of all arrests and nearly 50% of arrests for serious offenses.126 
Recidivism rates of young offenders were also increasing, and there was 
growing concern about the failure of the system to effectively rehabilitate 
youths.127 Yet, juvenile delinquency was no longer a top priority for federal 
policy-makers. The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 
1968, which provided block grants to assist state and local communities in 
providing community-based diversion and treatment, was overshadowed by 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, just as the War on 
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Delinquency was recast as a War on Crime.128 The race riots of the 1960s129 
had in large part catalyzed the crime bill, which focused on enforcement 
strategies for preventing further rioting, thereby racializing law enforce-
ment.130 In short, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s law and order directive 
meant that federal officials had set aside delinquency prevention and instead 
committed themselves to militarizing the police in order to focus on the 
surveillance and punishment of young offenders.131 
2. The Expansion of Children’s Rights 
It was in this context that the U.S. Supreme Court decided In re Gault 
in 1967, establishing basic due process rights in juvenile court proceed-
ings.132 Until then, youths appearing in delinquency court were denied criti-
cal procedural protections, including the right to counsel, notice of the 
charges, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.133 Gerald Francis Gault, the appellant, was a 
15-year-old white boy134 in Gila County, Arizona, who had been adjudicat-
ed delinquent for making an obscene phone call to an adult female neigh-
bor.135 Police had taken him into custody overnight without notifying his 
parents, and he appeared in juvenile court the following day without an at-
torney.136 At the initial hearing, although the complaining witness did not 
appear, the judge aggressively questioned Gault about the phone call; at a 
second hearing, the judge summarily committed Gault to the State Industri-
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al School until age twenty-one.137 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona and remanded the case.138 
In the opinion, Justice Fortas portrayed Gerald Gault sympathetically, a 
seemingly deliberate choice139 that mirrored a societal shift in the conception 
of children: once viewed as a form of property, children in the mid-twentieth 
century were more likely to be seen as autonomous, rights-bearing individu-
als, independent of parents and the state.140 Justice Fortas repeatedly referred 
to Gault by his first name and emphasized the trivial nature of the offense, 
stating that Gerald and another “boy” made remarks of “the irritatingly offen-
sive, adolescent, sex variety.”141 He mentioned that both of Gerald’s parents 
were at their jobs when their son was picked up by police and taken into cus-
tody, suggesting that the family was hard-working.142 He dismissed the juve-
nile court proceedings as those of “a kangaroo court,” implying that it was 
disorganized and unreliable, in which witnesses at the second hearing had 
differing recollections of what Gerald had admitted to at the first.143 
There is only one explicit mention of race in the Gault opinion. Before 
holding that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies to 
juveniles in the same way it applies to adults, Justice Fortas quoted a U.S. 
Supreme Court case from twenty years earlier.144 In 1948, in Haley v. Ohio, 
an early children’s rights case, the Court reversed the adult court murder 
conviction of a Black fifteen-year-old boy because of a coerced confession 
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mum penalty would have been a five dollar to fifty dollar fine or two months’ imprisonment, ra-
ther than six years commitment as a juvenile delinquent. Id. at 8–9, 29. 
 138 Id. at 59. 
 139 See id. at 4 (describing Gault making a call with “another boy” in which they made re-
marks of the “irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety”); e.g., Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, 
Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 142 (1997) (describing the way in which judicial opin-
ions select from among many facts, and that this “resulting rendition of ‘the facts’ can thus be seen 
as a story crafted to support the court’s holding,” and acknowledging that if the court were to 
reach a different result, it would select different facts and tell a different story); Peter Brooks, 
Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 6–17, 
22–25 (2006) (characterizing the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Bumper v. North Carolina 
as an example of courts engaging in the construction of narrative); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, 
Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 290 (2013) (arguing that narrative provides an underlying 
structure for judicial decisions); David Ray Papke, Discharge as Denouement: Appreciating the 
Storytelling of Appellate Opinions, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146–47 (1990) (discussing ways in 
which restatements of facts in appellate opinions are stories, not socio-legal developments). 
 140 See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s 
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 10 (1986) (describing the problematic dominant rhetoric of 
rights in legal scholarship). 
 141 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. 
 142 See id. at 5. 
 143 See id. at 5–7, 28. 
 144 Id. at 45 (emphasizing that admissions and confessions of juveniles warrant caution). 
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following five hours of questioning by several different police officers.145 
The Haley Court proclaimed that age fifteen is “a tender and difficult age 
for a boy of any race” and that “a lad of tender years” is no match for the 
police.146 The Haley Court’s explicit message was that even “Negro boy[s]” 
should be deemed worthy of the due process of law commanded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.147 Justice Fortas applied this reasoning to Gault, 
suggesting that if Black boys are considered to be “lads of tender years” in 
need of counsel and support, then Gerald, a white teenager, should certainly 
be as well.148 
By the time of the Gault decision, Black children were disproportion-
ately confined in juvenile correctional facilities149 and forty-two percent 
lived below the poverty line.150 Delinquency court, once considered revolu-
tionary for its focus on the child’s “‘needs’ rather than their past ‘deeds,’” 
frequently determined which children were less culpable than adults based 
on race.151 As in the nineteenth century, juvenile court judges treated “lads” 
who looked like their own children with “tenderness” and placed them on 
probation, whereas foreign, alien or “colored” children required “toughness,” 
which often meant commitment to institutions that were punitive.152 Such 
distinctions reflected the continued status of children of color as “less than,” 
as they were deemed not worthy of full citizenship, not worthy of government 
resources, and not capable of change. Yet, in some critical ways, the worst 
was yet to come. 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597–99, 601 (1948). 
 146 Id. at 599. 
 147 See id. at 597, 599. 
 148 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4, 47 (emphasizing the special caution to be applied to juveniles’ 
confessions); cf. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confes-
sion Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 115–16 nn.37, 40 (2012) (suggesting an-
other dimension of critical race theory analysis as applied to the Haley case). 
 149 WARD, supra note 21, at 4 fig.0.1, 236 fig.8.1 (showing that in 1970, approximately 35% 
of male youths committed to juvenile correctional institutions were “nonwhite” although they 
comprised less than 15% of the population of all youths); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 
9 (1967) (finding that surveys indicated that minority offenders were vastly overrepresented in the 
nation’s largest juvenile courts). 
 150 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 2, at 240. 
 151 See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Con-
servative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1448–51, 1460 n.34 (2003) (suggesting that Gault 
signaled that the Court was aware that minority youths did not receive equal treatment in juvenile 
court). 
 152 FELD, supra note 21, at 72–73. 
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C. 1990s “Superpredators” 
1. The Crime of Blackness 
Crime rates fluctuate, and “crime” itself can refer to several different 
categories of conduct, including violent crime, such as murder, rape, rob-
bery and assault; property crime, such as burglary, theft, and arson; and ju-
venile crime, committed by individuals under the age of eighteen. Begin-
ning in the 1970s and extending to the 1980s, the rate of violent crime and 
serious property crime in the United States climbed.153 Rates of these cate-
gories of crime then declined during the mid-1980s, rebounded by the early 
1990s, and decreased dramatically by 1995, falling to mid-1970s levels.154 
In short, contrary to media reports and public perceptions, the overall rate of 
all serious crime and juvenile crime did not increase substantially by the 
mid-1990s but “oscillated within a ‘normal’ plus or minus ten percent range 
that has prevailed since the late 1970s.”155 In addition, violent crime consti-
tuted only ten to fifteen percent of all crime, and juveniles accounted for a 
minority of all of those arrested for violent crime.156 
Nevertheless, there was an increase in the lethality of violence com-
mitted by young men between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four, which 
could be attributed almost exclusively to the illegal drug trade and the easy 
availability of guns.157 During the 1990s, the slow collapse of the manufac-
turing sector of the American economy158 and deep cuts to the social safety 
net by the U.S. Congress159 had given rise to the crack epidemic.160 The 
abuse of crack cocaine, which was overwhelmingly a drug of adolescents 
and young adults, and the violence generated by its illicit sale led to the 
decimation of much of the African-American community.161 Young men in 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Id. at 198 (citing the FBI Crime Index). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 207. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See André Bernard, Trends in Manufacturing Employment, 10 PERSP. ON LABOUR & IN-
COME 5, 5 (2009) (finding that the U.S. lost nearly one-quarter (4.1 million) of its manufacturing 
jobs between 1998 and 2008). 
 159 See Marianne P. Bitler & Hilary W. Hoynes, The State of the Social Safety Net in the Post-
Welfare Reform Era, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 71, 95–96, 99 (Fall 2010) 
(discussing the decline in cash welfare as well as food stamps government expenditures in the 
United States during the 1990s). 
 160 Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 
1651, 1652 (2013) (describing the rise of crack cocaine in the 1980s in Black and Hispanic com-
munities and the resulting impacts). 
 161 See generally id. (examining the impact of the crack epidemic on crime rates and finding 
that the rise in crack sales in large urban areas from 1984–1989 is associated with a doubling of 
homicide deaths of Black males, including those aged fourteen to seventeen). 
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their teens through their mid-twenties—a group that was disproportionately 
Black—committed a disproportionate number of the serious and violent 
crimes of this period, and arrests of this subgroup increased “significantly 
and more sharply” than for older adults.162 In response, legislators passed 
bills in dozens of states that made it easier for judges and prosecutors to 
transfer youths from juvenile to adult criminal court.163 As a result, the 
numbers of juveniles in adult jails rose sharply through the 1990s to a high 
of almost 9500 in 1999.164 Although young Black men who committed 
murders with guns were a “very narrow segment of the youth crime phe-
nomenon,” this cohort and the fear they engendered catalyzed the “tough on 
crime” policies of the 1990s.165 
Indicative of this climate was “the rise and fall of the superpreda-
tor.”166 The racially-coded label was a term coined by then-Princeton politi-
cal scientist John J. DiIulio Jr. in the 1990s, meaning “feral youths devoid 
of impulse control or remorse”167 who are “fatherless, Godless, and job-
less.”168 The reason for the emergence of these marauding packs of “feral, 
pre-social being[s],”169 according to DiIulio and the conservative scholar 
James Q. Wilson, was “moral poverty,” a condition caused by parents who 
                                                                                                                           
 162 FELD, supra note 21, at 207; see also Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented 
Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 27, 28 (1998) (noting a sharp rise in adolescent 
criminal behavior for serious crimes and highlighting that “the increase was concentrated on black 
males”); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control 
Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 37–38 (2008) (highlighting data that shows 
huge discrepancy in juvenile arrest rate for drug offenses based on race during the 1990s); Miles 
Corwin, NYPD Blues, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/28/books/
bk-34775 [https://perma.cc/PN67-M74V] (describing the rise in the mid-1990s of “hard-charging, 
militaristic methods . . . employed primarily in minority communities” to make arrests). 
 163 Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes, 18 JUV. 
JUST. 81, 86 (2008). 
 164 Id. at 95. 
 165 FELD, supra note 21, at 208; Brief for Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 37, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 
174240, at *37 (arguing that empirical research on the tough on crime legislation of the 1990s was 
misinformed by the superpredator myth that juvenile crime would continue to rise sharply). 
 166 See Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the Pre-
ventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 746–51 (2011) 
(presenting the “superpredator era” as a manifestation of the reconfiguration of modern criminolo-
gy, in which the goal shifted from social welfare to social control in a world in which “the indi-
vidual is an afterthought”). 
 167 See Feld, supra note 68, at 142–47; Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Su-
perpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/
killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [https://perma.cc/NP3C-MXJV]. 
 168 WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN 
AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 79 (1996). 
 169 James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME 489, 492 (James Q. Wilson & Joan 
Petersilia eds., 1995). 
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do not want to raise them, schools that do not educate them, and govern-
ment agencies too overburdened to assist them.170 Politicians quickly ex-
ploited the theory by calling for “adult time for adult crime.”171 Yet, the fact 
that DiIulio’s sensationalized predictions about a major crime wave by ju-
veniles did not come to pass coupled with the fact that murders committed 
by youths aged ten to seventeen fell dramatically after 1994 was not part of 
the narrative.172 Neither was the mea culpa issued in 2014 by DiIulio, who 
finally admitted, “Demography is not fate.”173 
Meanwhile, the media’s crime coverage grew increasingly racially bi-
ased as print and broadcast journalists also exploited the “superpredator” 
myth.174 News outfits directed their cameras on young Black males, show-
ing them hand-cuffed and shackled, held down by police, or led into court-
rooms wearing orange jumpsuits.175 Such images fed the public’s fears and 
were consistent with this negative characterization of the threat: “Radically 
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more preteenage 
boys, who murder, assault, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-
toting gangs, and create serious communal disorders.”176  
When journalists covered crimes in which the suspects were adoles-
cents, rather than emphasize their youth and limited culpability, they por-
trayed them as dangerous beyond their years, or as “superpredators.”177 In 
                                                                                                                           
 170 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 168, at 13, 56, 79 (defining “moral poverty” as “the poverty 
of being without loving, capable, responsible adults who teach you right from wrong”); see also 
supra notes 62–76 and accompanying text (discussing the emphasis on providing “moral guid-
ance” to youths during the House of Refuge movement in the nineteenth century). 
 171 See Joe Davidson, Clinton, Dole Getting Tough on Violent Juvenile Crime, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 22, 1996), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB840671096873438500 [https://perma.cc/TLR2-
GWZH] (describing Dole’s campaign against juvenile delinquency); Watch Hillary Clinton’s Con-
troversial 1996 ‘Super-Predators’ Comment, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/video/politics/watch-hilary-clintons-controversial-1996-super-predators-comment/2016/
02/26/1d0dcce4-dc88-11e5-8210-f0bd8de915f6_video.html [https://perma.cc/GQ7F-5PAY] (show-
ing Hillary Clinton speaking in support of the crime bill and referring to youthful offenders as 
superpredators who need to be “brought to heel”). 
 172 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 11, 13–14 (2013) (debunking 
DiIulio’s theory of the superpredator); Haberman, supra note 167 (citing statistics of the Justice 
Department’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). 
 173 Haberman, supra note 167. 
 174 See Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23 (calling the 
“superpredator”: “a monster of a problem”). 
 175 Feld, supra note 68, at 145–46. 
 176 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 168, at 27. 
 177 See, e.g., Ted Guest & Victoria Pope, Crime Time Bomb, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 
1996, at 28, 28 (“It may take an even greater bloodbath [by superpredators] to force effective 
crime solutions to the top of the nation’s agenda.”); Richard Zoglin & Sam Allis, Now for the Bad 
News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME INT’L, Jan. 15, 1996, at 52 (predicting a “teenage time bomb” 
in the form of the superpredator); Warren Richey, Teen Crime Trend Puts Them Behind Adult 
Bars, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 2, 1997), http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0602/060297.
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contrast, the press continued to focus on crime victims who were white, 
female, and middle-class, despite the reality that the rates of Black victimi-
zation exceeded that of whites.178 
2. Racialized Public Policy 
In these ways, the connection between race and crime was reinforced, 
and public policy became racialized. For example, the War on Drugs in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s focused on street-level crack and heroin dealers 
in high-poverty urban areas that were populated by African-Americans ra-
ther than powder cocaine dealers in suburbs populated by white middle-
class people.179 Laws themselves targeted the behaviors, habits, and life 
conditions associated with Black youths living in poverty. Mandatory trans-
fer of fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds from juvenile to adult court, for in-
stance, was triggered in Illinois by a statute criminalizing drug violations 
within one-thousand feet of public housing.180 A similar statute in Massa-
chusetts carried harsh penalties for drug distribution that occurred within 
one-thousand feet of a Head Start facility or one hundred feet of a public 
park or playground.181 Public curfew ordinances for juveniles were imple-
mented in increasing numbers of cities and counties, enabling police to stop 
and question youths based on their appearance alone.182 Comprehensive 
anti-gang initiatives were also launched in the 1980s, targeting young men 
in urban areas.183 
Today, nearly two decades into the twenty-first century, disproportion-
ate numbers of Black and brown adolescents continue to be stopped, 
                                                                                                                           
us.us.4.html [https://perma.cc/GM9Q-P7VU] (“America is being threatened by a growing cadre of 
cold-blooded teens called ‘superpredators.’”). 
 178 Feld, supra note 68, at 146. 
 179 See Bishop, supra note 16, at 36. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 94C, § 32J (2016). Head Start is a federal program of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services that provides comprehensive early childhood educa-
tion and other services to low-income children and their families. See About the Office of Head 
Start, OFF. HEAD START, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ohs [https://perma.cc/TP9T-J68D]. 
 182 See Bishop, supra note 16, at 37 (describing urban curfew laws as one example of how the 
law established disparate social control over minority youth); Tik Root, Life Under Curfew for Amer-
ican Teens: “It’s Insane, No Other Country Does This,” THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2016), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/28/curfew-laws-san-diego [https://perma.cc/F5AE-5PJJ] 
(finding that since the 1990s, millions of U.S. teenagers have been arrested for breaking curfew, 
which a policy analysis in San Diego has shown, has a disproportionate impact on minority 
youths). 
 183 See Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, OFFICE JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/antigang/ [https://perma.cc/8YMQ-WSLR] (stating that “since the 
1980s, OJJDP has developed, funded, and evaluated community-based anti-gang programs that 
coordinate prevention, intervention, enforcement, and reentry strategies”). 
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searched, arrested and to receive more punitive sanctions in juvenile court 
than white youths—even when charged with the same offenses.184 The case 
law and rules of criminal procedure that led to the disparate treatment of 
children of color may be facially race-neutral, but the impact is racially dis-
criminatory. Likewise, court actors continue to use rhetoric that reinforces 
and promotes racial stereotypes: deserving vs. undeserving youth, gang-
involved youths vs. youths with positive peers, and youths from “good” 
families vs. youths from “troubled” ones. The labels may be facially race-
neutral, but the language is racially-coded. In other words, legal formalism 
may be used to deny the realities of race, but structural racism remains, 
such that when a judge enters a disposition ostensibly based on the factors 
stipulated in the state’s juvenile code, her decision will likely be motivated, 
consciously or not, by biased notions of race. 
The next Part argues that these racialized practices, which cause im-
mediate and enduring harm to children and their communities, permeate the 
contemporary juvenile justice system. 
II. THE HARM OF RACIALIZATION 
On the most basic level, the process of racialization reinforces negative 
stereotypes about the “other,” whether they are people of color, immigrants, 
or poor people. As Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw has written, racialized ste-
reotypes are rooted in American history, in which a clearly subordinated 
“other” has consistently been “contrasted with the norm in a way that rein-
forces identification with the dominant group.”185 The non-stigmatized 
groups, or white elites and subordinated whites, then coalesce around a 
common identity that is defined in opposition to the symbolic “other.”186 
Racist ideology replicates this pattern, so that each traditional negative im-
age of Blacks correlates with a dominant counter-image of whites: if Blacks 
are lazy, unintelligent, immoral, and ignorant, then whites are industrious, 
intelligent, moral, and knowledgeable; if whites are law-abiding, responsi-
ble, and virtuous, then Blacks are criminal, shiftless, and lascivious.187 In 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 70, at 7, 9 (discussing data showing that in Los Angeles 
County, Black youths were more than three and a half times more likely to be arrested than white 
youths, and Latino youths were nearly one and half times more likely). 
 185 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372 (1988). 
 186 Id. at 1372–73 (“Western thought . . . has always been structured in terms of dichotomies 
or polarities: good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence . . . . These polar opposites 
do not, however, stand as independent and equal entities. The second term in each pair is consid-
ered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first, a fall away from it.” (quoting Jacques 
Derrida)). 
 187 Id. 
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short, stereotypes are used to rationalize the subordination of Blacks, mak-
ing their position in the hierarchy seem “logical and natural.”188 The harm 
of racialization is particularly damaging when a forum designed for children 
instead utilizes practices that entrench stereotypes of Black criminality. 
A. Perpetuation of Negative Stereotypes 
1. Children of Color 
The juvenile justice system rewards those children who most closely 
conform to mainstream, or white, norms of acceptability, whether in terms 
of appearance, family structure, or socioeconomic status,189 and in contrast, 
it penalizes those children who are perceived to be unable or unwilling to 
conform to these norms.190 For instance, recall Campbell, the small fifteen-
year-old of Caribbean descent who wore a blue button-down shirt and kha-
kis to court, expressed remorse in court, and spoke of his interest in drawing 
and painting; and recall Raekwon, the tall, Black fifteen-year-old with 
braids who entered the juvenile courtroom wearing low-riding baggy jeans, 
mumbled his answers to questions during the disposition hearing, and failed 
to address the judge as “ma’am” or “your honor.”191 Juvenile court judges 
are statutorily required to base a disposition upon factors that allow for dis-
cretion as well as some degree of subjectivity.192 Therefore, after observing 
and interacting with youths in court, the judge will likely use information 
about each child’s appearance and behavior to evaluate—consciously or 
unconsciously—whether negative stereotypes about African-Americans as a 
group should apply or whether stereotypes about positive, or white, social 
norms should apply. If it is the former, the judge’s assessment of the youth 
                                                                                                                           
 188 Id. at 1370. 
 189 See Birckhead, Delinquent, supra note 33, at 70–81 (discussing the structural and institu-
tional causes of the disproportionate representation of low-income children in the juvenile justice 
system); Donna M. Bishop et al., Contexts of Decision Making in the Juvenile Justice System: An 
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 190 See Bishop, supra note 189, at 214 (finding that because of limited time and information, 
juvenile court judges and other decisionmakers develop a “perceptual shorthand” that relies on 
common stereotypes associated with offender characteristics, such as race and class, as well as 
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 191 See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2501 (2016) (enumerating such factors as the degree of cul-
pability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case). 
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will typically be more critical and unforgiving; if it is the latter, it will be 
more positive and affirming.193 
The intersection between race and class must also be recognized, par-
ticularly in the context of juvenile court, which traditionally has been a fo-
rum for the poor and impoverished.194 Although there have been, and con-
tinue to be, families of means whose children appear in delinquency court, 
they are the exception rather than the rule.195 Although few juvenile courts 
document the socioeconomic status of children’s families, those that do 
have confirmed that nearly sixty percent are on public assistance and/or 
have household incomes of less than twenty-thousand dollars per year.196 Fur-
ther, although court officials and police officers assert that they direct low-
income families into the juvenile justice system out of a desire to provide 
“help,” this paternalistic attitude ultimately allows the state to attain social 
control over a wider swath of the poor.197 It is a contemporary dynamic that 
echoes the nineteenth century House of Refuge movement, which was cata-
lyzed in large part by the belief that immorality caused poverty.198 
In addition, the decisions that drive low-income families into the juve-
nile system are based on criteria that explicitly favor families of means, 
similar to the ways in which facially race-neutral policies and practices 
have a racially-discriminatory impact. For instance, research shows that 
police are more suspicious of children living in low-income neighborhoods 
than those from middle- or upper-class ones, a judgment that can be used to 
condone and even encourage aggressive law-enforcement tactics.199 When 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (“Merely thinking about Blacks can lead people 
to evaluate ambiguous behavior as aggressive . . . .”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, 
Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2630 (2013) (arguing that 
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 194 See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text (discussing the House of Refuge move-
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notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing the labeling of poor children as “wayward 
youths” and the underlying belief that immorality causes poverty, a state that “ripens into crimi-
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 195 See H. Ted Rubin, Impoverished Youth and the Juvenile Court: A Call for Pre-Court Di-
version, JUV. JUST. UPDATE,, Dec.–Jan. 2011, at 1, 1–2. 
 196 Id. at 1 (discussing the 2008 report of the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, 
Tennessee). 
 197 See Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference in 
Juvenile Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959, 970–73 (2010) (finding that today’s juvenile court 
judges often focus on the needs of the juvenile when adjudicating them delinquent without first 
objectively determining whether a criminal offense has been committed). 
 198 See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 199 Bishop, supra note 16, at 45. 
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low-income parents do not appear for the initial intake interview with the 
juvenile court probation officer, in some jurisdictions they are automatically 
deemed “uncooperative” and the child is ineligible for a diversion contract, 
even if the cause is a lack of reliable transportation or the inability to re-
ceive mail because of transient housing.200 Similarly, when a low-income 
parent does not appear at her child’s school suspension hearing or contest 
the resulting referral to juvenile court, teachers and probation officers may 
view her as “not caring” about her child when the true cause may be an ina-
bility to secure leave from her job or advocate effectively.201 All such char-
acterizations are based on stereotypes that are socioeconomically and also 
frequently racially coded. 
By perpetuating negative stereotypes, racialization enables legislators 
and policy makers to more readily justify punitive practices that dispropor-
tionately harm racial minorities. In the context of the delinquency court sys-
tem, this includes such practices as the indiscriminate use of shackles—
handcuffs, leg irons, and belly chains—on children, no matter their age or 
circumstances;202 detention in jail-like settings that offer neither meaningful 
treatment nor education;203 and transfer to adult criminal court premised on 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Birckhead, Delinquent, supra note 33, at 83–84 (discussing empirical research that poor 
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not contest an arrest as vigorously as more affluent middle-income parents might.”). 
 202 See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDISCRIMINATE JUVENILE 
SHACKLING, TOOLKIT 5, 13, 14 (2016) (finding that the rationalizations for shackling are not 
supported by the data); Candace Johnson & Mae C. Quinn, Chaining Kids to the Ever Turning 
Wheel: Other Contemporary Costs of Juvenile Court Involvement, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 159, 162–65 (2016), http://lawreview.journals.wlu.io/chaining-kids-to-the-ever-turning-
wheel-other-contemporary-costs-of-juvenile-court-involvement/ [https://perma.cc/CF97-BR5G] 
(describing shackling as an unregulated practice that perpetuates second-class citizenship by sub-
jugating an entire population of children through actual bondage). 
 203 See, e.g., DIGNITY IN SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN THE JUVENILE 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 8–11 (2008) (discussing the low-quality 
of education programs offered in juvenile detention facilities); BARRY HOLMAN & JASON 
ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCER-
ATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 2, 4–5, 8–10 (2006) (finding that 
juvenile detention facilities are overcrowded and understaffed, breeding neglect and violence, 
ultimately harming juveniles’ futures). 
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factors that place people of color at a distinct disadvantage.204 For youths 
who end up in criminal court, the practices include imprisonment with 
adults, which puts them at high risk of sexual violence;205 prolonged periods 
of solitary confinement, which research has shown causes psychological, 
physical, social and developmental harm to youths;206 and extreme sentenc-
es such as juvenile life without parole.207 All of these practices are counte-
nanced based on judgments, whether implicit or explicit, that juvenile of-
fenders deserve “toughness.”208 Legislators, prison administrators, and poli-
cy makers defend the practices and deem them appropriate, an unsurprising 
result when the impact is felt by “other people’s children,” namely, the 
Black kids, the poor kids, the throwaway kids: the kids who have no voice. 
2. Risk Assessment 
Stereotypes underlying racialized rhetoric in juvenile court are further 
perpetuated by the increasing application of risk assessment tools that rely 
on algorithms based on a small number of variables about the child and her 
family.209 These statistical models and software programs are designed to 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Fagan, supra note 163, at 96–98 (discussing the “cumulative disadvantages by race” 
that exist in a juvenile case, including at charging, detention, and the decision to seek waiver, and 
concluding that racial disparities in the incarceration of minors in state prisons results in large part 
from implicit bias); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203(b) (stating that in a transfer hearing, the 
court shall consider, inter alia, the prior record of the juvenile and prior attempts to rehabilitate the 
juvenile, both of which may be impacted by implicit racial bias and whether the alleged offense 
was “committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner,” a conclusion that 
allows for a subjective race-based determination by the judge). 
 205 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, KEY FACTS: CHILDREN IN ADULT JAILS & PRISONS 
1 (2011) (stating that although federal law requires that youth in the juvenile system be removed 
from adult jails or have sight-and-sound separation from adults, these requirements do not apply to 
youth in the adult criminal justice system); James E. Robertson, The “Turning-Out” of Boys in a 
Man’s Prison: Why and How We Need to Amend the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 44 IND. L. 
REV. 819, 827–28 (2011) (finding that although there is a “dearth of [empirical] data” on the rate 
of victimization of youths in adult facilities is, it is well documented that youths serving adult time 
are “easy and frequent sexual prey”). 
 206 See Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (discussing the harm of solitary confinement of youths). 
 207 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 
(2016) (stating that racial disparities “plague the imposition of [Juvenile Life Without Parole] 
sentences,” with over 42% imposed on African Americans convicted of killing white people). 
 208 See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the catalyzation of the touch on 
crime policies in reaction to fear of black male youths). 
 209 See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing?utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=opening-statement&utm_term=news
letter-20160523-492#.sKRwyz8PJ [https://perma.cc/AA9F-4YQP] (reporting that risk assessment 
tools are used at some stage of the criminal justice process in nearly every state and utilize such 
variables as the age of the child, gang association, and level of parental supervision). 
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use current and historical data to help judges and juvenile probation officers 
assess the child’s “risk” during the juvenile court process—including intake, 
when determining whether to approve the filing of a juvenile petition, divert 
the child to a program in lieu of court-involvement, or reject the petition; 
the initial court appearance, when deciding whether to allow the juvenile to 
remain at home or place her in preventative detention during the pendency 
of the case;210 and disposition, when ruling on whether to place her on pro-
bation or commit her to a juvenile institution. 
The degree to which risk assessment tools either help or hinder the at-
tainment of equal justice within the court system is subject to debate. Be-
cause these tools tie the degree of risk most closely to prior criminal history, 
including prior arrests as well as convictions, and because criminality is 
often a proxy for Blackness, there is a strong argument that they exacerbate 
racial disparities.211 With this in mind, United States Attorney General Eric 
Holder suggested that risk assessments for defendants were injecting bias 
into the court system and should be studied.212 Legal scholars have weighed 
in on both legal and empirical grounds to argue that risk assessments that 
include demographic and socioeconomic variables are unconstitutional as 
well as bad policy, as they embrace otherwise-rejected discrimination under 
the guise of science.213 For instance, one has argued that because such vari-
ables as the offender’s family background or the family’s criminal history 
are beyond the offender’s control and are unchanging, they are quasi-
suspect classifications that violate the Equal Protection Clause.214 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Pro-
tection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 303–04 (2008) (discussing Schall v. 
Martin and arguing that the subjective nature of many preventative detention statutes adds to the 
risk of arbitrary outcomes); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256–57, 263, 281 (1984) 
(holding that a New York statute allowing for pretrial detention of a juvenile based on a finding of 
“serious risk” of recidivism met the due process “fundamental fairness” standard). 
 211 Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015); see also Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 563, 565–66, 585–86 (2014) (arguing that prior convictions can be an unreliable 
indicator of a defendant’s relative culpability as a result of disparities in enforcement, including 
those in which the convictions had been the product of racial profiling and the corresponding 
sentences affected by implicit racism). 
 212 Eric Holder, Attorney General, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice 
Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/
VL4X-8SAG]. 
 213 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Dis-
crimination, 66 STANFORD L. REV. 803, 821–23 (2014) (providing the equal protection concerns 
of evidence based sentencing based on socioeconomic status and demographics). 
 214 Id. 
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In contrast, there are federal agencies, such as the Department of Jus-
tice’s National Institute of Corrections, that encourage the use of such as-
sessments and a sentencing reform bill pending in the United States Con-
gress, which mandates the use of such assessments in federal prisons.215 
Advocates for statistical approaches to juvenile and criminal justice say 
they reduce racial disparities, minimize incarceration rates, and result in 
lower costs,216 but the empirical research on whether predictive algorithms 
accomplish these goals is limited.217 Some academics contend that at the 
very least, these tools should be rigorously tested before adoption, and that 
the data should be made available to the defendant and her attorney to en-
sure “an open, full-court adversarial proceeding.”218 
B. Race-Based Decision Making 
1. Inside the System 
The founders of the juvenile court system were driven by a desire to 
replace a system that did not differentiate between adults and children with 
one that focused holistically on the child.219 This philosophical shift re-
quired that decisionmakers have wide-ranging discretion to subjectively 
consider not only the facts regarding the offense but every aspect of the 
child’s nature and environment.220 In 1909, one of the first judges of the 
Chicago Juvenile Court contended that the juvenile court judge should act 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See Sentencing Reform & Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong (2015) (requiring 
the Bureau of Prisons to use a risk and needs assessment systems); ROGER K. WARREN, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES, 73–77 (2007) (arguing that principles of evidence-based 
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 216 ANGÈLE CHRISTIN ET AL., DATA & SOCIETY RESEARCH INST., COURTS AND PREDICTIVE 
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 217 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.
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higher government costs”). 
 218 Angwin et al., supra note 217 (quoting Christopher Slobogin of Vanderbilt Law School). 
 219 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106–107 (1909) (describ-
ing the development of the new juvenile justice regime). 
 220 Id. at 119–21. 
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“as a wise and merciful father handles his own child whose errors are not 
discovered by the authorities.”221 
This legacy is significant, as the contemporary journey from a child’s 
single act of misbehavior to the issuance of criminal charges is one with 
multiple decision-points along the way, each of which involves some degree 
of discretion on the part of the person entrusted to make the decision.222 
With unchecked discretion inevitably comes implicit bias, the phenomenon 
in which human beings unconsciously hold attitudes or stereotypes about 
certain social categories, such as race, gender, or ethnicity.223 For instance, 
police officers, whether patrolling neighborhoods or assigned to schools, 
often must act based on the accumulation of split-second judgments about 
youths regarding who should be stopped, who should be arrested and re-
ferred to juvenile court, who should be diverted from the court system, and 
who should be disciplined informally.224 These judgments by law enforce-
ment are frequently impacted by the phenomenon of implicit racial bias.225 
School administrators,226 intake probation officers,227 and prosecutors228 
then consider the officers’ initial judgments and determine whether to rely 
upon and follow them or question and potentially reject them—decisions 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Id. at 107. 
 222 For judicial decisions noting the wide discretion of judges over juvenile justice matters, 
see .”); Commonwealth v. Harold H., 682 N.E.2d 1369, 1371(Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (“[A] judge 
has wide discretion in determining whether a juvenile should remain within the juvenile system or 
be tried as an adult . . . .”); State v. L.W., 6 P.3d 596, 599 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he [Juvenile 
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and if detention is not necessary, to release him or her with a wide variety of conditions.). 
 223 See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 
(2012) (defining the term, “implicit bias”). 
 224 See Fagan, supra note 204, at 98 (“A long line of studies shows how race influences police 
officers’ decision making and judgment about suspicion and dangerousness.”). 
 225 Id.; Kang et al., supra note 223, at 1135 (discussing the implicit racial bias of police dur-
ing the initial police encounter when a decision is made whether to interrogate, frisk, or arrest). 
 226 See Cheryl Staats, Understanding Implicit Bias: What Educators Should Know, AM. EDU-
CATOR, Winter 2015–2016, at 29, 30–33 (discussing implicit bias in education and strategies for 
mitigating its influence). 
 227 See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About 
Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494, 499–500 (2004) (finding that as a result of 
negative stereotypes and implicit bias, juvenile probation officers perceive African-American 
youths as having more negative traits, a greater chance of recidivism, and greater culpability than 
white youths). 
 228 See Kang et al., supra note 223, at 1139–42 (discussing findings that prosecutors are more 
likely to charge Black suspects over white suspects, that the charges brought against Black de-
fendants are likely to be more severe than for white defendants, and that generous plea bargains 
and sentences are more likely for white defendants). See generally Robert J. Smith & Justin D. 
Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SE-
ATTLE U.L. REV. 795 (2012) (considering how prosecutorial discretion may be influenced by 
implicit bias). 
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that also may be affected by implicit bias. Once young people are in the 
court system, judges must interpret statutes that allow for a significant de-
gree of discretion, allowing for additional determinations colored by implic-
it racial bias.229 Even defense attorneys are likely to reinforce and perpetu-
ate these judgments throughout a case, from the race-based decisions they 
make during jury selection and voir dire230 to advising their young Black 
clients to speak, dress, and act like “good Blacks” during court hearings: 
Social science evidence . . . suggests the banal, commonplace, 
and normalized influence of racial biases in everyday case pro-
cessing in the juvenile and criminal courts, much of it influenced 
by implicit biases. Either directly or through surrogates and sub-
stitutes such as clothing, demeanor, neighborhood, or other racial 
cues, unconscious or conscious biases influence decisions about 
whom to arrest and how to charge and sentence them.231 
In short, racial biases permeate the justice system, affecting all of its actors. 
2. Outside the System 
Decisionmakers within the juvenile justice system must also rely on 
information from sources outside the system to inform them, creating addi-
tional opportunities for discretion to negatively impact the way cases are 
handled and ultimately resolved. For instance, the juvenile court has broad 
authority to order evaluations of youths by forensic psychologists and psy-
chiatrists for the purpose of assisting court personnel in a variety of con-
texts, such as the determination by the judge whether to waive jurisdiction 
and transfer the youth from juvenile to adult court or the dispositional rec-
                                                                                                                           
 229 See David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 347, 349, 374 (2012) (finding from an analysis of empirical data that some judges treat 
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 231 Fagan, supra note 204, at 98. 
2017] Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Defense Attorney 421 
ommendations of the probation officer, including the type and number of 
probationary conditions that are proposed. 232 Subjectivity influences foren-
sic evaluations in large part because of racial disparities in the diagnosis and 
treatment of certain disorders, resulting from “individual and institutional 
racism, as well as negative stereotypes in the healthcare system.”233 
Overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain racial groups is partic-
ularly likely in diagnostic categories that researchers characterize as “judg-
mental” or those that do not have a clear biological basis and for which con-
textual factors are important.234 
Research has indicated, for example, that African-American children 
are more likely than white children to be diagnosed with disorders that are 
part of the Disruptive Behaviors Disorder spectrum.235 This group of disor-
ders includes Conduct Disorder,236 which is characterized by having diffi-
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177, 179–80 (2006) (discussing the types proceedings during which forensic evaluations may be 
utilized). 
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State University) (examining the relationship between race and health care disparities in the treat-
ment for ADHD); see also Sasha Atkins-Loria et al., Young African American Men and the Diag-
nosis of Conduct Disorder: The Neo-colonization of Suffering, 43 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 431, 
431, 439–40 (2015) (finding that African-American men are overrepresented among those diag-
nosed with conduct disorder, which likely reflects “institutionalized racism within psychological 
clinical practice,” and that this fact “fits seamlessly into the legacy of criminalizing Black men in 
the United States”). 
 234 Maddox & Wilson, supra note 233, at 156. 
 235 See Atkins-Loria et al., supra note 233, at 432–33 (finding that African-American youths 
with serious mental health needs caused by behavioral disorders are more likely to be diagnosed 
with these conditions than white youths and that white youths with such disorders are referred to 
hospitals, whereas African-American youths are steered towards the juvenile justice system); see 
also Margarita Alegria et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pediatric Mental Health, 19 CHILD 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICIANS N. AM. 759, 762 (2010) (reporting that there are “high 
rates of serious emotional disturbance” among groups of youths in the juvenile justice and child 
welfare systems, which have high percentages of underserved minority youth). 
 236 See Atkins-Loria, supra note 233, at 433 (finding that conduct disorder is one of the most 
frequent diagnoses given to youth within the juvenile justice system); Eddie Clark, Conduct Dis-
orders in African American Adolescent Males: The Perceptions That Lead to Overdiagnosis and 
Placement in Special Programs, 33 ALA. COUNSELING ASS’N 1, 5 (2007). 
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culty following rules and behaving in a “socially acceptable way.”237 Such 
children are considered “‘bad’ or delinquent, rather than mentally ill”.238 
Similarly, Black children are more likely than whites to be diagnosed with a 
second disorder in the spectrum, Oppositional Defiant Disorder,239 which is 
characterized by “an ongoing pattern of uncooperative, defiant, and hostile 
behavior toward authority figures.”240 In contrast, some studies suggest that 
Black children are less likely than whites to be diagnosed with Attention 
Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), characterized by symptoms 
of inattention, hyperactivity, or impulsivity and considered to have a biolog-
ical, rather than environmental basis.241 Other studies suggest that, although 
white healthcare providers are more likely to rate African-American chil-
dren with higher levels of hyperactive or disruptive behaviors than white 
children, they still fail to diagnose them with ADHD, even when the con-
cerning behaviors are “normal, within the context of cultural expecta-
tions.”242 Black children with ADHD are also less likely to receive adequate 
treatment or to be prescribed psychotropic medication for the condition than 
white children with ADHD.243 In short, the stigma of a conduct disorder 
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FOR CNS DISORDERS (2014), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC431
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ance coverage for psychiatric or psychological evaluations, which contributes to fewer diagnoses 
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 242 Bailey & Ofoemezie, supra note 241, at 198. 
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diagnosis in legal proceedings, as opposed to a biological-based one, such 
as ADHD, can influence decision making in a punitive direction, resulting 
in exclusion from community-based mental health programs, transfer to 
adult court, or a longer sentence.244 One group of researchers explained: 
“[T]here is a continued epistemological and linguistic assault on the identi-
ties of Black youth and that violence continues through the threads of clini-
cians’ language, descriptions, and conceptualizations of minority groups 
when formulating diagnostic pathology.”245 
Because a significant percentage of delinquency court cases emanate 
from school-based incidents and behaviors, a similar dynamic in public 
schools also impacts juvenile court proceedings.246 As in the court setting, 
research confirms that students of color of all household income levels ex-
perience a disproportionate amount of discipline at school.247 Black stu-
dents, for instance, are more likely to be referred to the school administra-
tion for misbehavior than white students, and the reported behaviors for 
Black students are more likely to require subjective evaluations (defiance, 
excessive noise, or disrespectfulness), whereas white students are more typ-
ically referred for observable, objective behaviors (smoking, vandalism, 
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leaving campus without permission).248 When the misbehavior of Black 
students is a manifestation of an emotional disability, they are more likely 
than white students to be punished and pushed out of the traditional school 
setting than to receive counseling or other types of assistance.249 
C. Relinquishment of Rights 
1. Interactions with the Police 
In addition to perpetuating negative stereotypes and validating subjec-
tive decision making, racialization profoundly harms children and commu-
nities by forcing people of color to choose between their rights—legal, pri-
vacy, dignitary—and their safety or security. For youths, this “negotiation” 
can occur within a variety of contexts, most commonly during interactions 
with police. As Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explained: 
[T]he immediate issue when police treat minorities unfairly isn’t 
fairness, but the ability to negotiate between a suspect’s sense of 
self as a rights-bearing person of worth and dignity and the sus-
pect’s sense of what he needs to do to manage the police encoun-
ter and to establish that he is neither a criminal nor otherwise 
dangerous. Engaging in conduct to demonstrate that one is neither 
dangerous nor a criminal will often compromise one’s rights.250 
Yet, even when people of color alter their behavior or relinquish their 
rights in order to counter negative stereotypes, troubling interactions with 
police and other authority figures cannot always be prevented.251 For in-
stance, when Black youths have interactions with police, they are more like-
ly than white youths to give up a legal right (to remain silent upon arrest or 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Adam C. Wright, Teachers’ Perceptions of Students’ Disruptive Behavior: The Effect of 
Racial Congruence and Consequences for School Suspension 5 (Nov. 2015), available at https://
aefpweb.org/sites/default/files/webform/41/Race%20Match,%20Disruptive%20Behavior,%20and
%20School%20Suspension.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMP5-8ZU7] (unpublished paper, Department 
of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara). 
 249 Fenton, supra note 201, at 81 (quoting Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Con-
fronting Barriers in the Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L. REV. 295, 
325–28 (1993)); see also Bailey & Ofoemezie, supra note 241, at 203 (“African-American males 
make up the majority of students described as ‘emotionally disturbed’ and are more likely to be 
suspended, expelled from school or subjected to corporal punishment than their white or female 
peers.”). 
 250 CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 35, at 103. 
 251 This is, of course, an understatement, given the many instances of racially-biased treat-
ment and violence by police against people of color. See generally TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN 
THE WORLD & ME (2015) (demonstrating the many ways in which police brutality is a system-
ized, ubiquitous threat to Black bodies). 
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refuse to consent to a search without a warrant), a privacy right (to refuse to 
provide personal information when randomly stopped), or a dignitary right 
(to be treated with respect) in an attempt to appear non-threatening and less 
“Black.”252 Add to the mix a lifelong distrust of law enforcement, and a 
youth’s determination not to arouse a police officer’s suspicion may become 
even stronger. Many African-American parents and grandparents, particu-
larly of young males, take pains to teach the importance of immediate 
demonstration of “subservience and respect” when in the presence of a po-
lice officer.253 They also prepare their Black children for police interactions 
by telling them to pull up their pants, keep their hands out of their pockets, 
move slowly, carry identification, and do what the officer says.254 In other 
words, surrender your rights or endanger your life. 
The survival instinct that kicks in when a teenager is confronted by 
law enforcement can be easily overcome, however, by the realities of ado-
lescent brain development, including impulsivity, risk-taking, and emotional 
outbursts.255 For instance, a Black youth who acts particularly nervous 
when stopped by a police officer may “cause” the officer to ask to search 
him.256 The teen, out of a desire to prove his innocence and compensate for 
his nervousness, may consent to a search even if he possesses illicit materi-
als, because he believes that only people with something to hide would re-
fuse to be searched. Or maybe the youth consents to the search because he 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 35, at 96–97 (“These performances constitute a form 
of racial labor that is potentially stigmatizing, dignity destroying, and privacy compromising.”). 
 253 Id. at 103; see also PBS NEWSHOUR, How Parents Talk to Their African-American Sons 
About the Police (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/parents-talk-african-american-
sons-police/ [https://perma.cc/XP8Y-E8BA] (“It’s maddening. I get so frustrated and angry about 
having to prepare my kids for something that they’re not responsible for. And these are conversa-
tions that people of other races do not have to have with their children.”). 
 254 See Michael Martinez et al., Within Black Families, Hard Truths Told to Sons Amid Fer-
guson Unrest, CNN (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/15/living/parenting-Black-
sons-ferguson-missouri/ [https://perma.cc/C56U-TJHA]. 
 255 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: De-
velopmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSY-
CHOL. 1009, 1011–15 (2003) (describing adolescents deficiencies in decision making, heightened 
vulnerability to coercion, and unformed character as limitations on their criminal culpability). 
 256 See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. 
Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 417–18 (2008) (stating that “[i]t has . . . been shown that 
teenagers, as a result of lack of confidence and general anxiety during [police] questioning, avoid 
making eye contact, qualify their statements, respond in monosyllables, and provide nonlinear 
narratives that are difficult to follow,” all of which are behaviors that investigators are trained to 
associate with deception); Rebecca Gold, Perceptions of Search Consent Voluntariness as a Func-
tion of Race 9–10 (2015), available at http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/652/ 
[https://perma.cc/6QF3-GK27] (unpublished senior thesis, Scripps College) (finding that the race 
of police officers and the person they search affects how that person perceives the search and 
suggesting that the voluntariness of consent is also affected by race). 
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does not believe that he has a right to refuse to cooperate. This type of cir-
cular reasoning only increases the likelihood that the teenager will make a 
poorly considered decision—to resist or to run—that could turn what should 
be a routine encounter into a deadly one. 
2. In Juvenile Court and School 
This form of “racial labor”257 can also occur in the juvenile system 
when Black youths are interacting with judges, probation officers, and even 
their own lawyers.258 For instance, when youths of color appear in court, 
they not only regularly abandon their dignitary and privacy rights in order 
to demonstrate that they are “good Blacks” but their legal rights as well. 
When the success of a particular defense relies upon the juvenile to take the 
stand and testify, such as in self-defense, entrapment, or conspiracy, a Black 
youth will likely consider very different factors than a white youth when 
deciding whether to go forward with a contested hearing. For instance, fear 
of taking the stand and answering questions in a hostile forum or disbelief 
that the judge will objectively evaluate their testimony as a result of their 
race may be the driving factor in a Black youth’s decision to waive the right 
to an adversarial hearing and admit to the charge.259 Likewise, delinquency 
court norms place particular significance on the sincerity of the juvenile’s 
expression of remorse (with judges regularly directing the juvenile to turn 
and face the victim in the courtroom and “tell them you’re sorry”), but this 
                                                                                                                           
 257 CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 35, at 96–97 (describing the incentive for African Amer-
icans to “work their identities” and give up some rights and dignity to defy racial stereotypes in 
their interactions with police officers). 
 258 See Elyce Zenoff Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of 
Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 387–88 (1971) (discussing a study of lawyers’ attitudes in a 
public defender office, which found that attorneys would advise their juvenile clients to invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination based on several factors including whether “the defender be-
lieves that the juvenile is a ‘good kid’ or a ‘bad kid’”); Richardson & Goff, supra note 193, at 
2636–38 (finding that when defense attorneys make biased judgments about client credibility 
during the initial meeting, they may irrationally question their client’s version of events and as a 
result decide not to pursue investigative leads or file motions challenging the government’s evi-
dence). 
 259 See RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY CASES 326 (2015) (discussing situations in which the juvenile is agreeing to plea 
“only with considerable reluctance” or when the juvenile is “unable to cope with the nervous 
stress that attends a trial”); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, 
and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
553, 574 (discussing juvenile court and “judges’ tendency to credit police officers even when their 
accounts seem highly dubious” and to be “unduly skeptical of the testimony of the accused”). 
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too may be cause for heightened anxiety or embarrassment for a child of 
color, whose sincerity may not be fairly judged because of his race.260 
In the school setting there also is pressure to surrender one’s rights in 
order to counter or at least dissipate negative racial stereotypes, including 
the right to speak, ask questions, and interact with their peers—in essence, 
the right to learn. Black students, particularly when in the minority, may 
avoid class participation as well as mere engagement with the material so as 
not to draw attention to themselves and risk negative feedback or ridicule, 
whether from white students or teachers.261 The phenomenon of “stereotype 
threat,” as defined by social psychologist Claude M. Steele, is the risk of 
confirming, as a self-characteristic, a negative culturally shared stereotype 
about one’s group, and finding that this “predicament” disrupts the perfor-
mance of individuals who identify with that group.262 Therefore, Black stu-
dents may choose not to play “Black” sports like basketball or football and 
opt for the cross-country or lacrosse team instead.263 They may refuse to 
participate in extracurricular activities and disengage completely from peers 
out of fear that they cannot effectively adhere to white norms of respectabil-
ity.264 If there is a critical mass of Black students at a school, this group may 
retreat from the school community in other ways. They may cluster together 
in the hallway, on the playground, or at the same table in the cafeteria, as-
suming an “oppositional stance” as protection from potential racism and to 
keep the dominant (white) group at a distance.265 Similarly, Black youths may 
underperform academically for reasons unrelated to ability, such as associat-
ing studying and academic success with “acting white” or with compliance 
with the majority culture, norms they may have been socialized to reject.266 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Duncan, supra note 11, at 1473 (challenging the law’s view of remorse as an emotion-
al state that “decent” people—regardless of age—demonstrate after committing a heinous offense, 
and explaining that for developmental reasons, adolescents “may show less grief than the system 
demands”). 
 261 See TATUM, supra note 41, at 58–59 (providing a few examples of students who received 
negative feedback from teachers based on stereotypes associated with being Black). 
 262 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Perfor-
mance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995); see also 
Nalini Ambady et al., Stereotype Susceptibility in Children: Effects of Identity Activation on 
Quantitative Performance, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 385, 388–89 (2001) (finding that children are affect-
ed by stereotype threat in the similar ways as adults). 
 263 TATUM, supra note 41, at 63. 
 264 Id. at 59–60. 
 265 Id. at 60; see also DONNA Y. FORD, REVERSING UNDERACHIEVEMENT AMONG GIFTED 
BLACK STUDENTS 173 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that Black students may have a particularly 
strong need to bond with others with similar concerns, and that, when confronted with racism, 
they may develop an oppositional social identity). 
 266 TATUM, supra note 41, at 62–64; see also Carla O’Connor et al., The Meaning of “Black-
ness”: How Black Students Differentially Align Race and Achievement Across Time and Space, in 
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In each of these settings, pressures come to bear on Black youths as a 
result of negative stereotypes as well as the “adultification” of children of 
color. Empirical studies have recently shown that whites routinely perceive 
Black children and adolescents to be older than their actual age. For in-
stance, a study released in 2014 found that “Black boys are seen as older 
and more responsible for their actions relative to White boys.” and are “less 
likely to be afforded the full essence of childhood” than their white peers.267 
The authors suggest that this phenomenon results from the dehumanization 
of Black children, which allows white people to perceive them as not need-
ing basic protections and leaves them vulnerable to the harshest treatment 
and punishments typically reserved for adults.268 The findings suggest that 
“although most children are allowed to be innocent until adulthood, Black 
children may be perceived as innocent only until deemed suspicious.”269 In 
this way, the research helps crystalize the extent of the harm to young peo-
ple when racialization perpetuates negative stereotypes, encourages biased 
decision making, and compromises a child’s sense of herself and her legal 
rights. 
In addition to causing harm to the individual child, the racialization of 
juvenile justice exposes a critical tension between two very different models 
of criminal defense, as discussed in the next Part. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
Until the Court decided In re Gault in 1967, criminal defense attorneys 
had a minimal role in juvenile court cases, as few juveniles had their own 
lawyers.270 The prevailing view was that children did not need representa-
tion because juvenile court was a non-adversarial treatment court, and 
counsel would “seriously hamper” the process.271 Many judges also explic-
itly discouraged juveniles and their parents from retaining counsel, as they 
                                                                                                                           
CONTESTING STEREOTYPES AND CREATING IDENTITIES: SOCIAL CATEGORIES, SOCIAL IDENTI-
TIES, AND EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION 183, 185 (Andrew J. Fuligni ed., 2007) (noting that 
Black students may have a notion that schooling is the “province of white Americans and threat-
ens their own cultural identity”); John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interro-
gate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 432 & n.59 (2000) (citing Signithia Fordham and 
Ogbu’s study that Black students may deliberately under-perform to disassociate themselves with 
perceived whiteness of academic excellence). 
 267 Phillip Attiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 539 (2014). 
 268 Id. at 527. 
 269 Id. at 529, 541. 
 270 David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individ-
ualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 796 (1966) (“In most of the [juvenile] courts studied, at-
torneys appear for the juveniles in no more than five per cent of the cases.”). 
 271 Id. 
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believed that the presence of a defense lawyer would likely thwart the 
court’s “‘childsaving’ [sic] mission” and the judge’s otherwise unbridled 
discretion.272 In addition, many families of children appearing in juvenile 
court were of limited means and simply could not afford to hire attorneys, 
because there was no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel for 
the indigent pre-Gault.273 
One of the most significant changes from the pre- to post-Gault era 
was the shift in the defense lawyer’s role vis-à-vis her young client.274 Pre-
Gault, defense attorneys assumed a similar orientation toward the youth as 
did the judge, probation officer, and other social services personnel—to act 
in the “best interests of the child.”275 This approach was consistent with the 
traditional court’s focus on the history and circumstances of the child’s life 
rather than the specific offense charged, because the court’s goal was to di-
agnose and prescribe a “cure” for each delinquent child, regardless of the 
seriousness of the case itself.276 In 1966, the attorney’s role pre-Gault was 
described this way: “He is not to utilize ‘technical objections’ to obtain a 
finding of no delinquency. Rather he is to act as the servant of the court in 
the process of ascertaining the truth—a function that seems to entail active-
ly encouraging his client to confess.”277 
 Although Gault was not explicit about the role of counsel in delin-
quency matters, the decision did signal a change from a single-minded em-
phasis on the moral and emotional needs of the child (often without concern 
for whether the youth had, in fact, committed the offense) to ensuring that 
the child’s rights were protected.278 The Gault majority stated: 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When 
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1192 
(1989) (describing the hostility of juvenile court judges to attorneys in delinquency proceedings). 
 273 See David L. Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Pro-
ceedings, 43 IND. L.J. 558, 575 (1968) (estimating the rate of indigency in juvenile court cases and 
suggesting that 50% of those appearing in juvenile court would qualify for appointment of coun-
sel). 
 274 See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the 
Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 246–47, 250 (2005) 
(describing Gault’s guarantee of juveniles’ right to counsel, as well as the resulting ambiguities as 
to the role of the juvenile’s lawyer in delinquency cases). 
 275 Id. at 246–47. 
 276 See Jacqueline L. Bullard, “Whose Side Are You on Anyway?”: Best Interest Versus Ex-
pressed Interest Representation of Minors in Delinquency Court, in PROMISE UNFULFILLED: JU-
VENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 105, 109 (Cathryn Crawford ed., 2012) (utilizing a model of repre-
sentation based in the original rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court). 
 277 Barrett et al., supra note 270, at 797 (emphasis added). 
 278 See Bullard, supra note 276, at 108–09 (describing the shifting models of representation 
post-Gault); Ferster et al., supra note 258, at 385–86 (discussing the development of juvenile 
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The juvenile [requires] the assistance of counsel to cope with prob-
lems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon 
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a de-
fense and to prepare and submit it. The child “requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”279 
Post-Gault, with the judge’s newfound focus on determining the 
child’s legal guilt or innocence, defense attorneys were expected to assume 
a zealous and client-directed role more akin to that of an adult’s criminal 
defense lawyer.280 The attorney’s new role was to act as the state’s adver-
sary or in juvenile court parlance, to act in accordance with “the expressed 
interests of the child” or what the child states to be her objectives.281 None-
theless, best-interest advocacy continues to persist in many juvenile courts 
in the United States today282 despite consensus among professional organi-
zations and legal scholars that the appropriate role for counsel in delinquen-
cy cases is as an expressed-interest advocate.283 
The credo of expressed-interest lawyering, however, does not provide a 
clear answer to the question of the propriety of adopting racialized rhetoric 
when defending juveniles. This Part considers the ethical rules relevant to this 
dilemma, the application of those rules to the juvenile court context, and 
strategies for finding an answer to the question that is sustainable, if not ideal. 
                                                                                                                           
attorneys’ role post-Gault to include protection of the juvenile’s rights, with different interpreta-
tions of what this entails). 
 279 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1967) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 
(1932)). 
 280 Henning, supra note 274, at 246; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 368 (1970) 
(holding that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the ‘essentials of due process and fair 
treatment’ required during the adjudicatory stage” of a juvenile case). 
 281 Henning, supra note 274, at 246. 
 282 Id. at 257 (“[I]t is clear that the expressed-interest zealous advocate model is far from 
uniform in practice throughout the country.”). 
 283 See, e.g., IJA-ABA JOINT COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 3.1(a) (1980) (providing that “the lawyer’s principal 
duty is the representation of the client’s legitimate interests”); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to 
Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 76, 86 (1984) (stating that the rights that Gault gave to juveniles “would be rendered illusory 
if the child were not given the power to direct his own counsel”); Ellen Marrus, Best-Interests 
Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Ac-
cused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 295 (2003) (arguing that the different views of counsel’s role 
in juvenile court are misleading because “zealous advocacy is in the child’s best interests” (em-
phasis added)); see also Birckhead, supra note 197, at 967–68 (describing the development of 
zealous representation or expressed-interest representation as the current standard of delinquency 
lawyering). 
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A. Zealous Representation vs. Social Costs 
1. The Parameters of the Debate 
The forgoing emphasis on the harm engendered by racialization may 
seem to imply that the practice should always be avoided. Yet the questions 
posed in the Introduction remain: Is it an ethical violation to utilize a strate-
gy that benefits one’s client but implicitly harms the broader community? 
What if the decision has the potential to harm one’s other clients? In the 
alternative, does the duty of zealous representation require utilization of the 
strategic approach that is the most beneficial for each individual client, re-
gardless of its impact on others? Two decades ago, Professors Anthony Al-
fieri and Abbe Smith engaged in a dialogue related to these questions that 
continues to resonate today.284 
In a series of three articles, Professor Anthony Alfieri argued that 
“race-talk,” which he defined as the “colorblind and color-coded narratives 
heard in courtrooms and law offices,” may “appear facially neutral but in-
flict[s] invidious injury.”285 For illustration, he discussed the strategy used 
by defense attorneys on behalf of two African-American men who were 
charged with participating in riots following the acquittal of police officers 
on allegations of brutally beating Rodney King in 1992.286 Alfieri con-
demned the lawyers’ use of “deviance and defiance narratives,” in which 
some young Black males are portrayed as “bad,” meaning predatory and 
controlled by bestial instincts, whereas others are “good,” meaning law-
                                                                                                                           
 284 Compare Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1998) [hereinafter 
Alfieri, Race Trials] (arguing against defense attorneys who “acknowledge and exploit racialized 
norms to advance the chosen purposes of representation”); and Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching 
Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Alfieri, Lynching Ethics] (calling for remedial regulation that directs criminal defense lawyers 
to “reject the use of deviance-based racialized strategies unless such strategies are necessary to 
frustrate, by means of jury nullification, a racially discriminatory prosecution”), and Alfieri, supra 
note 45, at 1306 (arguing that “criminal defense lawyers representing Black males in cases of 
racially-motivated private violence bear a race-conscious responsibility to forgo narratives or 
stories that construct racial identity in terms of individual, group, or community deviance”), with 
Smith, supra note 46, at 1591 (arguing that “Alfieri’s project is wrong-headed and regressive as a 
matter of both practice and theory” and that he is “joining forces with those who care least about 
the least among us: the poor, the Black, the accused, and the imprisoned”). 
 285 Alfieri, supra note 45, at 1303. In this Article’s discussion of these issues, the author uses 
Alfieri’s term, “race-talk,” in a manner that is consistent with his definition. 
 286 Id. at 1301–04 (describing the defenses utilized, “mistaken identity” and “diminished ca-
pacity under a ‘group contagion’ theory of mob violence,” in order to investigate “race-talk” in 
criminal defense advocacy); see also The Rodney King Riots Erupt in Los Angeles, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 29, 1992), available at http://www.aaregistry.org/historic_events/view/rodney-king-
riots-erupt-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/AN9Y-25FN] (describing the large-scale urban race riot). 
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abiding and rational.287 He rejected the defense teams’ decision to character-
ize their clients as deviant and having “diminished capacity”288 to resist the 
“contagion” of violent group behavior that occurred in South Central Los 
Angeles.289 He depicted their strategy as illustrating “the tendency in crimi-
nal defense advocacy to pathologize racial difference.”290 Alfieri defined the 
harm of such advocacy as “demonizing” and “subordinat[ing]” Black males 
and “falsify[ing Black] experience.”291 He argued that in the context of 
criminal prosecutions of private acts of violence motivated by racial differ-
ence (Black on white or white on Black), criminal defense attorneys have a 
“race-conscious responsibility to forego” any and all narratives that “con-
struct racial identity in terms of individual, group, or community devi-
ance.”292 This is Alfieri’s “strong” version of the defense attorney’s obliga-
tion to the community, which differs in part from his alternate “weak” ver-
sion in which “lawyers abide by a lesser obligation to inform clients of 
their reservations concerning the use of racialized narratives and urge them 
to consider through character and community deliberation the impact that 
such narratives may have on their communities.”293 In other words, accord-
ing to Alfieri, the criminal defense lawyer must choose one of these two 
approaches to demonstrate her “commitment to a collective, race-conscious 
conversation.”294 If, instead, the lawyer makes a deliberate choice, with or 
without client consultation, to use a racialized narrative, the lawyer has ex-
posed herself to ethical as well as moral scrutiny.295 In this instance, con-
sciously using “race-talk” is akin to “deny[ing], exploit[ing], and ultimately 
demean[ing] race in the name of advocacy.” 296 
In response, Professor Abbe Smith contended that in the grand scheme 
of the criminal justice system, defense attorneys have the least power and 
remain the most under-valued and under-resourced, making them ill-
equipped to take on these additional burdens.297 She argued that the crimi-
                                                                                                                           
 287 Alfieri, supra note 45, at 1304, 1309. 
 288 See Diminished Capacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the term 
as “an impaired mental condition . . . that is caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease and that 
prevents a person from having the mental state necessary to be held responsible for a crime”). 
 289 Alfieri, supra note 45, at 1311, 1323–24 (arguing that this “privileging of a narrative of 
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 290 Id. at 1312. 
 291 Id. at 1332, 1334. 
 292 Id. at 1303, 1306. 
 293 Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). 
 294 Id. at 1339. 
 295 Ahmad, supra note 47, at 122 (discussing the ethical debate between Professors Alfieri 
and Smith). 
 296 Alfieri, supra note 45, at 1342. 
 297 Smith, supra note 46, at 1587–91. 
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nal lawyer’s sole responsibility is to provide zealous advocacy to her client, 
not to protect the community either by wholly rejecting these narratives or 
by urging her clients to consider the negative impact on their communi-
ties.298 She characterized Alfieri’s theory as fitting the mold of “emerging 
neo-conservatism in legal ethics” that focuses on tearing down criminal de-
fense lawyering and expressing hostility toward the adversarial system.299 
She agreed that high publicity cases have the potential to impact how the 
broader community thinks about race and to reinforce prejudices, but that 
no “real, tangible harm” results from race-talk by defense lawyers.300 Smith 
concluded by observing that because racism exists in every aspect of the 
criminal justice system, under Alfieri’s ethical analysis, every defense story 
would be considered a racialized narrative, thereby thwarting the practice of 
criminal defense.301 
The way in which these two scholars framed the debate invites further 
examination of the role of the juvenile defender302 although first there are 
several distinctions that must be acknowledged. The dialogue between Pro-
fessors Alfieri and Smith seems, at least on paper, to be cabined by their 
emphasis on rhetorical strategies used by defense lawyers303 and does not 
consider the related question: whether judges, prosecutors, and other court 
actors as well as legislators and the media at large have their own obliga-
tions to refrain from exploiting “race-talk.” Similarly, Alfieri explicitly lim-
ited his argument to high-profile cases of racially motivated private vio-
lence,304 without examining racialization as it has been and continues to be 
used throughout the juvenile justice system—in all types of cases, by all 
categories of people, regardless of the offense charged.305 
Yet, even with these differences in mind, there are helpful analogies 
that can be made using the contrasting positions of Alfieri and Smith as 
touchstones. Although it is a fact that seems of little relevance today, the 
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 304 See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 45, at 1302 (“[I] explore the form and substance of the Wil-
liams and Watson legal teams’ diminished capacity defense.”). 
 305 See supra notes 185–269 and accompanying text (describing the various ways in which the 
juvenile justice system racializes children in the perpetuation of negative stereotypes, race-based 
decision making, and the relinquishment of black children’s rights). 
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adversarial criminal trial is of recent historical origin. Before the eighteenth 
century, prisoners were denied the right to counsel, to subpoena and depose 
witnesses, and to notice of charges.306 It was not until the nineteenth century 
that prisoners were routinely allowed representation and the right to chal-
lenge the state’s evidence.307 This symbolized a radical shift from the in-
quisitorial system, in which the parties played a less direct role and a neutral 
magistrate objectively undertook the task of managing the evidence in order 
to ascertain the truth.308 Some of the same tensions that exist between the 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems may be seen today in the dynamic be-
tween expressed-interest and best-interest advocacy in delinquency court: in 
both pairs, the former requires zealous, passionate representation by the 
lawyer for the accused, and the latter relies on the judge to define the scope 
and the extent of the inquiry.309 Likewise, the former is premised on the be-
lief that the best way to ascertain the truth is to allow adversaries to try to 
prove their competing version of the facts, and the latter relies on neutral 
parties to embark on an objective quest for the truth.310 
A further analogy can be made to the tensions that arise when consid-
ering different “modes of persuasion and the centrality of narrative.”311 Al-
fieri’s approach to persuasive narrative is consistent with the philosophies 
that undergird the inquisitorial system and best-interest advocacy, with all 
three purporting to reject a “deformed adversarial environment”312 that “by 
its nature, is competitive, antagonistic, and frequently destructive.”313 
Likewise, all three embrace contextual analysis that yearns for “authentici-
ty” and strives to achieve “an actual or absolute sense of truth.”314 In con-
                                                                                                                           
 306 JOHN HOSTETTLER, FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE: THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
TRIAL 11 (2006). 
 307 Id. at 17. 
 308 See id.; Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1083, 1088–90 (1975) (discussing the role of the magistrate and the parties in an inquisi-
torial system). 
 309 See Inquisitorial System, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing how the 
presence of this tension in the juvenile justice system has resulted in a “culture clash”); Birckhead, 
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interest vs. expressed-interest advocacy in juvenile court). 
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sarial and inquisitorial systems). 
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trast, Smith’s perspective is directly in line with the fervor that drives ex-
pressed-interest advocacy and the adversarial model: 
[E]specially in these angry times, there is all the more need for 
passion on behalf of the accused. There is all the more need for 
the kind of fierce devotion that the best defenders afford their cli-
ents. Without this kind of passion and devotion, an accused might 
as well have no lawyer at all.315 
In other words, Smith refused to allow for any considerations, ethical or 
otherwise, to compromise the defense attorney’s single-minded allegiance 
to her client—or even to give the appearance of compromise. 
2. The Ethical Rules 
With each of the two opposing groups of categories,316 there is a 
shared orientation toward the rules of professional ethics, reflected by 
Smith’s invocation317 and Alfieri’s rejection of them.318 Although the rules 
can be interpreted to provide at least some support for both views, there is 
more explicit support for Smith’s position. The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“MRPC”), for instance, emphasize the lawyer’s duty to “zealously 
assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system,” a 
clear reinforcement of the duty of unmitigated loyalty to one’s client.319 The 
MRPC also recognize that “a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of 
a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done,” by uphold-
ing “legal process”320 This suggests that as long as a defense attorney pro-
vides rigorous representation to her client within the bounds of the law, her 
ethical obligations are complete; she need not take any additional steps to 
achieve justice. Similarly, the ABA standards for defense attorneys explicit-
ly state that defense counsel’s “primary duties . . . are to serve as the ac-
                                                                                                                           
 315 Smith, supra note 46, at 1600–01. 
 316 See supra notes 309–315 and accompanying text (referring to one group as comprising the 
inquisitorial system, best-interest advocacy, and Alfieri’s position, and the other group as compris-
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 317 Smith, supra note 46, at 1589 n.26 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 
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cused’s counselor and advocate with courage and devotion; to ensure that 
constitutional and other legal rights of their clients are protected; and to 
render effective, quality representation.”321 Perhaps most explicitly, the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“MCPR”) states: “In the final 
analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-
legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.”322 In short, 
consistent with Smith’s position, the ethical rules give defense attorneys the 
freedom, in consultation with the client, to craft persuasive narratives that 
“draw upon prevailing norms and beliefs, no matter how problematic they 
may be.”323 
On the other hand, the MCPR also states that “[i]n assisting his client 
to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out 
those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as 
legally permissible.”324 Similarly, the MRPC recognizes that a lawyer’s pro-
fessional judgment is determined not only by law but by “other considera-
tions such as moral, economic, social and political factors.”325 Comments to 
the MRPC add that “[a]lthough a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, 
moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and 
may decisively influence how the law will be applied.”326 Nevertheless, 
these considerations or factors must “be relevant to the client’s situation.”327 
Whether harm to the community can be said to come under the rubric of 
“the client’s situation” is arguable. The MCPR states that, although a law-
yer’s devotion to one’s client does not detract from “concurrent obligations” 
to treat others “with consideration” and “avoid the infliction of needless 
harm,” such consideration is limited to third parties who are “involved in 
the legal process.”328 Whether the client’s community can be said to be “in-
volved in the legal process” is also arguable. Thus, interpreting the formal 
rules in the light most favorable to Alfieri, it can be said that, although they 
                                                                                                                           
 321 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-
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do not mandate that a lawyer forgo “race-talk,” they do encourage a lawyer 
to consider a narrative’s broader impact upon their community. 
B. Beyond the Ethical Rules 
1. The Juvenile Court Context 
Although there is value in the arguments of both Professors Alfieri and 
Smith, the open question is how best to approach the quandary as an attor-
ney defending youths in juvenile court. As argued earlier, there is a legacy 
of racialized juvenile justice in the United States.329 Racialized language, 
expressed explicitly or implicitly via facially race-neutral labels, is not be-
nign.330 Whether it is used in a case that is covered closely by the press or in 
a courtroom that is closed to the public, it is harmful. For two hundred 
years, racialization within the juvenile justice system has caused and con-
tinues to cause actual and sustained damage to individual children and their 
families, and it compromises the values of an egalitarian society.331 Profes-
sor Alfieri contended that the use of denigrating racialized narratives by 
criminal defense attorneys is always problematic and should be avoided.332 
Professor Smith conceded that defense strategies in high-profile cases can 
indeed “influence public opinion and discourse” and thus potentially hurt 
the community, but she maintained that the decision to use race talk is a 
matter of “individual client conscience, not legal ethics.”333 She also distin-
guished these cases from the bread and butter matters that comprise the bulk 
of the criminal court docket.334 
Because the focus here is on the juvenile court, a forum populated by 
children, adolescents and their families, the problem should be parsed some-
what differently. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Roper v. Sim-
mons in 2005, juveniles are different developmentally, intellectually, and 
socially from adult offenders: they are comparatively immature, vulnerable 
to outside pressures, and in a perpetual state of transition, with their charac-
ters and personalities in flux.335 Therefore, when a lawyer adopts a defense 
                                                                                                                           
 329 See supra notes 51–184 and accompanying text (describing the history of race in the juve-
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strategy that requires portraying people of color as deviant or predatory, the 
potential damage to the youth’s self-image may be profound. It can even be 
said that, because of adolescents’ greater vulnerability to the phenomenon 
of “stereotype threat,” resulting at least in part from the plasticity of the ad-
olescent brain, such acts of racialization are especially harmful.336 Yet, a 
juvenile defender’s conclusion that a rhetorical strategy causes harm, 
whether to the individual child or the community, does not justify Alfieri’s 
blanket prohibition of that strategy for all cases and clients—but neither 
does it justify Smith’s insistence that as long as the strategy advances the 
client’s objectives, little or no attention need be paid to the nature of the 
harm perpetuated by defense counsel. In short, the dichotomy between nev-
er using racialized rhetoric and always using it when it helps strategically is 
a false one. 
2. Finding a Middle Ground 
Particularly because of the unique challenges of defending adoles-
cents,337 an alternative, or middle ground, must be found. It may be inferred 
from the ethical rules that the juvenile defense attorney has an ethical obli-
gation, as well as a moral one, to make a deliberate decision whether to use 
such rhetoric, rather than doing so impulsively or without regard for the 
resulting harm. The attorney also has an ethical duty to be a zealous advo-
cate, but this does not require that defense attorneys always use whatever 
rhetorical approach is most “strategic,” which can itself be a subjective de-
termination. Although ethical rules clearly instruct that strategic decisions 
are ultimately for the lawyer and not the client,338 the decision of whether to 
                                                                                                                           
 336 See supra notes 261–266 and accompanying text (discussing “stereotype threat”); see also 
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utilize the narrative should result from a process that respects the lawyer’s 
commitment to zealous advocacy as well as the client’s autonomy. Yet, bal-
ancing these obligations is admittedly complicated when one’s client is a 
child who may lack the intellectual and emotional wherewithal to weigh the 
nuanced pros and cons of deploying racialized rhetoric.339 It may also be 
complicated by the fact that the very act of raising the topic of the potential 
harm to the community of a certain strategy may itself place pressure on the 
client to make a decision that is against her interests.340 Likewise, it may 
cause the client to question the defense attorney’s own allegiance to her and 
to her case. 
Several legal scholars, Professor Kristin Henning prominent among 
them, have offered an approach to navigating these waters. They have ar-
gued that decisions in juvenile cases be made only after weighing all the 
factors, discussing with one’s client all the options in the context of the the-
ory of the case,341 and maintaining fidelity to the client’s goals.342 As part of 
this organic process, the juvenile defender must carefully take into account 
“moral, economic, social, and political factors,” but only to the extent that 
they are relevant to the client and her situation.343 Because developmental 
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factors may affect the attorney-client dynamic, the lawyer must cultivate 
strategies to make the process of interviewing, counseling, and decision 
making with juvenile clients more effective.344 She must patiently explain 
the rationale for her use or rejection of racialized rhetoric in the client’s 
case.345 The lawyer must be candid about the fact that the use of the lan-
guage could result in perpetuating stereotypes, facilitating subjective deci-
sion making, and encouraging the relinquishment of one’s rights.346 She 
should provide her client with examples of each of these potential harms so 
that the discussion is concrete and not abstract. In these conversations, the 
lawyer should structure the options in a way that does not implicitly lead 
the client toward one over the other. The lawyer should also be open to the 
possibility that her client will persuade her to change her own mind. In ad-
dition, the lawyer and client may be able to find a strategic alternative to 
“race-talk” that will be equally or more effective, thereby enabling the de-
fense attorney to “win” for her client as well as “protect” the community 
and remain in compliance with the ethical rules.347 In other words, in the 
spirit of collaboration the lawyer should aspire, while recognizing the many 
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petent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal 
elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent 
practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation.”). 
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challenges of juvenile representation, to make the young client a partner in 
her advocacy.348 
Although this approach may resemble Professor Alfieri’s “weak” ver-
sion of the “principle of collectivity,” it differs in an important way: it 
leaves room for the lawyer and client to conclude that the benefits of using 
racialized rhetoric outweigh the potential harms.349 In contrast, Alfieri’s 
“lesser obligation” is only “lesser” because, rather than direct the lawyer to 
forgo any and all narratives of racial deviance, it obliges the lawyer to in-
form the client of one’s reservations regarding the narratives and then urge 
the client to consider the harmful impact the narratives may have on their 
community.350 In other words, either the lawyer must forgo all “race-talk” 
or she must tell her client why she does not want to use “race-talk” and then 
provide a litany of the likely harms. There is no option, however, for the 
lawyer to suggest to the client that a racialized narrative should be used. 
Therefore, this is not a description of a conversation or an honest attempt to 
have a meeting of the minds; rather, it is a scenario in which the person in 
the position of power, the lawyer, coerces the person in the position of 
weakness, the young client. In this way, Alfieri’s “weak” version is merely a 
less direct approach to prohibiting the use of racialized narratives than his 
“strong” one, but it is not fundamentally different. 
The calculus becomes quite different, however, when the juvenile de-
fender hits a proverbial brick wall in her interactions with the adolescent 
client, making collaboration, if not simple communication, difficult at best. 
Given the important shift in the role of defense counsel in juvenile cases 
post-Gault, one might naturally turn to the expressed-interest advocacy 
model for guidance as to how best to approach such scenarios.351 Scholars 
and practitioners have argued, however, that the model fails to adequately 
take into account the myriad challenges that juvenile defenders face when 
trying to determine and understand their young clients’ objectives.352 Fur-
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ther, it is not uncommon for criminal defense lawyers to lack the time, en-
ergy, or competence to establish rapport with their clients.353 Public defend-
ers in particular may have unwieldy caseloads or multiple courtroom as-
signments that prevent them from providing their clients with much more 
than a few abbreviated conversations in the corridor of the courthouse.354 It 
is also not uncommon for a criminal defendant, whether an adult or youth, 
to lack the ability (whether the result of intellectual, emotional, or situation-
al hurdles) to form a bond with her lawyer such that counseling can be ef-
fectively accomplished.355 Alternatively, the client may be unable or unwill-
ing to express her interests, let alone her views regarding strategy or tac-
tics.356 After adding in the difference in age and maturity between client and 
lawyer, and the often complicating influence of the child’s parent or guardi-
an, the challenge becomes even greater.357 
Instances such as these can leave the conscientious lawyer in the re-
grettable position of having to decide a case-related strategic, ethical, or 
moral decision without the client’s input. One viable option, after conclud-
ing that appointing a different lawyer would not overcome the impasse,358 is 
for the client to direct her lawyer to make the decision on her behalf, as long 
as deference to defense counsel is the result of the juvenile’s independent 
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 358 This prerequisite would help ensure that the cause of the impasse was not the specific 
dynamic between a particular lawyer and child. 
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choice.359 Another option is to request that the judge appoint a guardian ad 
litem to act as the “eyes of the court” to further the best interests of the 
child, although introducing another adult decisionmaker into a juvenile de-
linquency case can be counterproductive.360 If all else fails, there may be 
little choice but to abandon one’s fealty to a collaborative theory of juvenile 
defense. In the extreme this may mean that the lawyer must make a unilat-
eral decision without much, if any, input from the client. Admittedly such a 
result is far less than ideal, as it harkens back to the entrenched history of 
paternalism in the juvenile court system,361 but it may offer the only sus-
tainable strategy under the circumstances. Such a result is also arguably de-
fensible under the ethical rules, as it results not from the lawyer’s opposi-
tion to adolescent decision-making autonomy, but from the necessity for the 
lawyer to substitute her judgment for the client on a matter of strategy.362 
The calculus may also be different when the defense lawyer’s intent is 
to use a racialized narrative or strategy that will potentially harm her other 
clients. Recall the scenario in which the student advocate, in close consulta-
tion with her juvenile client, determines that she will characterize him in 
court as a “good kid,” describe all the features that make him “good,” and 
then contrast this with features that make other kids “bad.”363 According to 
the foregoing analysis this is not unethical even if it implicitly harms the 
Black community.364 Take it one step further and imagine that the student 
advocate has other similarly situated Black clients whom she cannot in 
good faith describe as fitting the characteristics, which she previously had 
                                                                                                                           
 359 Henning, supra note 274, at 315–16 (discussing the needs and desires of children and 
adolescents to have the assistance of a knowledgeable adult and legal advisor, which may require 
the lawyer to “appropriately advise and persuade the client” of a specific course of action or to 
advise the client that she is choosing a bad alternative and why). 
 360 Guardians ad litem (“GAL”) are regularly appointed in dependency cases to represent the 
best-interests of the child. When it happens in delinquency cases, it inserts yet another actor who 
is focused on the child’s best interests. It is unclear how this can be beneficial from the defense 
perspective. See Joan L. O’Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for the Alleged Incapacitated Person, 31 
STETSON L. REV. 687, 688 (2002) (discussing the differences in the roles of the defense attorney 
and the GAL). 
 361 See Henning, supra note 274, at 260–63 (discussing the entrenched history of paternalism 
in the juvenile justice system). 
 362 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“In a criminal 
case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea 
to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.”); STERLING, supra 
note 348, at 9 (“Other decisions concerning case strategy and tactics to pursue the client’s goal, 
like the determination of the theory of the case, what witnesses to call, or what motions to file, are 
left to juvenile defense counsel, with the critical limitations that counsel’s decisions . . . shall not 
conflict with the client’s expressed interests in any other case-related area.” (emphasis added)). 
 363 See supra notes 2–20 and accompanying text. 
 364 See supra notes 297–301 and accompanying text (describing Professor Smith’s defense of 
the use of race-talk in certain circumstances to zealously defend a client). 
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identified as “good” and that she will be representing them within the same 
court session, before the same judge, or in a hearing with the same prosecu-
tor. This could potentially raise a conflict of interest: the ethical rules direct 
that the relevant inquiry is whether “the attorney-client relationship or the 
quality of the representation is ‘at risk,’ even if no substantive impropriety—
such as a breach of confidentiality or less than zealous representation—in 
fact eventuates.”365 For instance, if the advocate’s relationship with the 
Black client whom she does not characterize as “good” is jeopardized, even 
if she continues to provide him with zealous representation, there is a con-
flict of interest.366 In this scenario, the risk of harm to the relationship must 
be “substantial,” meaning that it is “significant and plausible” that the rep-
resentation will be “materially and adversely affected.”367 According to the 
MCPR, the lawyer should “resolve all doubts against the propriety of the 
representation.”368 Nevertheless, the affected client has the power to waive 
the conflict of interest as long as she does so voluntarily, in writing, and 
with full knowledge of the risks.369 The conflict can also be a ground for 
court-ordered disqualification of the lawyer.370 
Taken to an extreme, as Professor Smith does when responding to the 
arguments of Professor Alfieri,371 this sort of dilemma may appear intracta-
ble. If emphasizing a white client’s goodness could harm a Black client, 
would not such a conflict exist in almost every criminal case? Recalling 
Campbell and Raekwon,372 for instance, it would mean that the student ad-
vocate could never emphasize Campbell’s “goodness” during the same 
court session in which she represents Raekwon, whom she feels she cannot 
                                                                                                                           
 365 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 261–62 
(5th ed. 2016) (defining conflicts of interest). 
 366 Id. 
 367 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1), MR 1.7 (b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (de-
scribing a conflict of interest with concurrent clients); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
E-5-14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasizing the importance of the lawyer retaining independent 
professional judgment and cautioning against representing two clients with different interests); 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 365, at 262 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOV-
ERNING LAWYERS § 121 & cmt. c(iii)). 
 368 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY E 5-15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 369 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (describing in-
formed, written consent; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 365, at 273 (discussing consent to con-
flicts of interest). 
 370 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 365, at 276 (discussing conflict of interest as a ground 
for court-ordered disqualification). 
 371 See Smith, supra note 46, at 1601–02 (applying Alfieri’s theory would unjustly burden a 
defense attorney, as every act can be considered racialized). 
 372 See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text. 
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similarly characterize.373 Such an interpretation of the rules would surely 
compromise the defense mission and ignore the objective reality that the 
facts and circumstances of some clients are more readily woven into an ef-
fective narrative than others. If Campbell has excellent grades, a record of 
volunteering at his church, and is a first-time offender, and Raekwon has 
lousy grades, no outside interests, and a lengthy record, labeling the former 
but not the latter client a “good kid” can be viewed as an example of a de-
fense lawyer merely fulfilling her duty of zealous representation by utilizing 
the facts as they are presented to her in each case. On the other hand, this 
hypothetical may be distinguished from the original scenario in which 
Campbell and Raekwon were similarly situated, as neither had a prior rec-
ord, they were charged with similar offenses, and both were influenced by 
older youths.374 Furthermore, in the original scenario, the differences be-
tween them resulted not from their own choices but from factors beyond 
their control, including family situation, appearance (which is related to soci-
oeconomic status), and natural temperament, making it more likely that the 
contrast in the way in which the judge treated each boy resulted not from an 
objective weighing of factors, but from implicit, if not explicit, racial bias. 
Such dilemmas illustrate one of the limitations of the ethical rules: 
they are narrowly focused on the representation of individuals. This leaves 
little room for broader social justice commitments on the part of the defense 
attorney, such as Professor Alfieri’s condemnation of “deviance narra-
tives.”375 Yet, from the perspective of Professor Smith and other client-
centered traditionalists, because the ethical rules are firmly rooted in the 
Bill of Rights and in the autonomy and dignity of the individual, there can 
be no compromise.376 Perhaps the most definitive conclusion is the admoni-
tion that criminal defense attorneys must always consider the importance of 
context when determining how best to address conflicts of interest that arise 
as a result of racialized rhetoric.377 Ideally the question of whether it is ethi-
cal or moral to promote “race-talk” during a juvenile case should be an-
swered only after the lawyer engages in a comprehensive analysis of the 
relevant facts and potential strategies together with the client. With this 
said, the lawyer must prepare herself for an end result that is messy, as she 
may have little choice but to make what amounts to a unilateral decision on 
                                                                                                                           
 373 See supra notes 292–296 and accompanying text (describing Professor Alfieri’s argument 
that the defense attorney must consider the impact of “race-talk” on their client’s community and 
other defendants). 
 374 See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text. 
 375 See supra notes 284–296 and accompanying text. 
 376 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 365, at 7. 
 377 Id. at 277–80. 
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behalf of her child client, one that balances, to the best of the lawyer’s abil-
ity, the ethical, strategic, and moral factors at play. 
C. Shifting the Paradigm 
1. Strategies du Jour 
Although juvenile defenders are particularly well situated to address 
the use of racialized strategies that harm their clients, there are systemic 
hurdles that must be overcome.378 As many as half of the children in juve-
nile court appear without counsel, meaning that they have no one whose 
specific role is to confront inequities in the system on their behalf.379 In 
most instances this results from “voluntary” waiver of counsel due either to 
a lack of appreciation of the defense attorney’s role380 or the family’s inabil-
ity to pay fees that often accompany court-appointed counsel.381 Of the 
youths who are represented, many receive subpar or ineffective assistance 
of counsel, as the quality of juvenile defense varies greatly from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.382 As discussed earlier,383 defense attorneys themselves (the 
                                                                                                                           
 378 See Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245, 2255–63 
(2014) (examining the systemic barriers that defense attorneys face in confronting racial injustice, 
including judicial resistance to zealous defense advocacy). 
 379 See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile 
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 580 (2002) (“Studies report that more than one-half of children ac-
cused of criminal acts appear in juvenile court without counsel and enter pleas to crimes they may 
or may not have committed.”). 
 380 See M. DYAN MCGUIRE ET AL., JOURNAL OF APPLIED JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVS., DO 
JUVENILES UNDERSTAND WHAT AN ATTORNEY IS SUPPOSED TO DO WELL ENOUGH TO MAKE 
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT DECISIONS ABOUT WAIVING THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL? AN EX-
PLORATORY STUDY 22–23 (2015) (concluding that “a substantial portion of juveniles probably do 
not fully understand concepts related to zealous representation and attorney-client privilege,” 
thereby negatively impacting their ability to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of 
counsel); Berkheiser, supra note 379, at 581 (“The most common explanation for the high number 
of unrepresented children [in juvenile court] is that they waived their right to counsel at an early 
stage in the proceedings.”). 
 381 See Tamar Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1641–47 (2015) 
(describing the almost punitive fines and fees that are levied against youth offenders in the juve-
nile courts who often cannot afford to pay). 
 382 See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 791–92 (2010) (stating 
that national and state assessments of juvenile defender systems demonstrate that “performance 
standards and ethical rules appear to be honored mostly in the breach”); see also Rebecca Beitsch, 
States Push Tougher Standards for Juvenile Public Defenders, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (May 5, 
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/05/05/states-push-
tougher-standards-for-juvenile-public-defenders [https://perma.cc/LV9D-CXDS] (discussing re-
cent state policies that require more training and more rigorous standards for juvenile public de-
fenders). 
 383 See supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text (discussing implicit bias and its impact 
on defense attorneys). 
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majority of whom are white) are not immune from implicit racial biases and 
may fail to recognize when others use racialized practices.384 This may be 
particularly so for public defenders, who often must make hurried decisions 
about which clients merit their attention and resources on any given day, a 
process akin to medical triage.385 It is in this context—a court system in 
which youths often lack representation or the counsel they have is ineffec-
tive—that the harm of racialization must be acknowledged and confronted.386 
One strategy is to mandate implicit bias awareness programs for de-
fense attorneys. In San Francisco, the public defender office recently part-
nered with researchers to measure racial disparities in plea bargains and 
found a correlation between race and outcomes: Black defendants were 
more likely to be convicted and to receive more severe sentences than white 
defendants.387 The office’s lawyers now undergo twice-yearly bias training, 
which the Public Defender of San Francisco describes as having a positive 
impact by requiring the staff to “confront our own racism.”388 The office 
also implemented practical safeguards, encouraging lawyers to discuss their 
case strategy with colleagues and use checklists that are designed to identify 
bias in the ways they prioritize and make decisions in their cases.389 Some 
professional organizations are heeding these recommendations, including 
the ABA, which is developing videos and other materials to help defenders 
as well as judges and prosecutors recognize implicit bias and take concrete 
steps to prevent it.390 
                                                                                                                           
 384 See Pearce, supra note 42, at 2091–93 (describing a scenario in which a white defense 
attorney failed to discuss with his African-American client, or argue to the court, that the police 
officer’s treatment of him was racially-motivated); Richardson & Goff, supra note 193, at 2636 
(discussing studies that suggest that “when clients are Black or otherwise criminally stereotyped, 
[implicit biases] can influence evidence evaluation, potentially causing [public defenders] to unin-
tentionally interpret information as more probative of guilt”); see also Richardson & Goff, supra 
note 193, at 2635 (“While [defense] attorneys must evaluate a case’s merits, the problem is that 
[implicit biases] may influence these judgments.”). 
 385 Richardson & Goff, supra note 193, at 2631–34 (discussing the process of triage in the 
context of public defense). 
 386 Law school clinics may be one place to attempt this type of time-intensive advocacy, given 
law students’ lower caseloads and law schools’ additional resources. 
 387 Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can Be Biased, Too, and It Hurts Their Non-white Clients, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07/
public-defenders-can-be-biased-too-and-it-hurts-their-non-white-clients/?utm_term=.c9379db861bf 
[https://perma.cc/S7DP-7EEM]. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. (discussing the use of a checklist that asks questions such as, “How would I handle this 
case different if my client was another race or had a different social background?”). 
 390 See generally Diversity & Inclusion 360 Commission, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
diversity-portal/diversity-inclusion-360-commission.html [https://perma.cc/M2NZ-TNMS] (provid-
ing materials for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders to understand and combat their implicit 
biases). 
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Defense attorneys are also more frequently raising the issue of race 
during jury selection and trial, recognizing that jurors and judges will notice 
these dynamics regardless of whether they address them explicitly.391 Some 
scholars have even insisted that defenders have an ethical obligation to do 
so, for otherwise they risk allowing “jurors’ implicit racial bias [to] become 
an (invisible) star witness for the prosecution.”392 Strategies for addressing 
race include neutralizing or contesting racial stereotypes or biases by differ-
entiating the client from the negative stereotype; explicitly challenging ra-
cially inflammatory arguments or evidence;393 and reinforcing norms of 
fairness and equality.394 Another approach involves taking steps that will 
inject the issue of racial discrimination into the court narrative, such as fil-
ing a motion to suppress that challenges a police officer’s implicit racial 
bias; gathering evidence of racial disparities related to the charges or in 
support of your defense; or requesting jury instructions that educate about 
implicit racial bias.395 
                                                                                                                           
 391 John M. Conley et al., The Racial Ecology of the Courtroom: An Experimental Study of 
Juror Response to the Race of Criminal Defendants, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1185, 1213–14 (describing 
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 394 See Blasi, supra note 47, at 1249–50, 1254, 1277 (finding that addressing fairness and equali-
ty explicitly in one’s oral advocacy can counteract the influence of stereotypes on decision making); 
Wilkins, supra note 392, at 332 (“[T]here is reason to believe one can prime persons with ideals of 
fairness and equality that might suppress, to a degree, racial and other stereotypes.”). 
 395 GRINE & COWARD, supra note 393, at 8-31, 8-35 (suggesting introducing expert testimony 
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strategies to make racial bias salient); ASHLEY NELLIS ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RE-
DUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS 
AND POLICYMAKERS 40 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing a case in which public defenders filed suppres-
sion motions to argue that the evidence obtained following traffic stops of African American mo-
torists violated equal protection); Sterling, supra note 378, at 2266–68, 2270–71 (discussing the 
use of motions to suppress to introduce evidence of an officer’s racial bias, via his record of ar-
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Like defenders, police officers increasingly are mandated to participate 
in implicit bias training. In June 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) announced that it will provide implicit bias training to all of its law 
enforcement agents and prosecutors.396 DOJ has also funded the develop-
ment of curricula for state law enforcement agents, which includes various 
specialized modules for recruits, patrol officers, first-line supervisors, and 
police trainers.397 The program has been praised for going further than 
merely identifying stereotypes. It encourages police officers via a program 
of “cultural immersion” to actively engage with populations outside their 
circle of knowledge, including people who are undocumented, homeless, or 
transgender.398 Related to implicit bias awareness training is youth-specific 
training, in which officers learn about adolescent brain development and 
disproportionate minority contact.399 The training provides officers with 
strategies for more effectively interacting with young people during stops 
and in their neighborhoods, thereby reducing the likelihood that the interac-
tions, especially with minorities “will have negative outcomes and/or result 
in police action.”400 Although most police departments do not offer youth-
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 400 CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN HUMAN DEV., UNIV. OF CONN., EFFECTIVE POLICE IN-
TERACTIONS WITH YOUTH: TRAINING EVALUATION 4 (2008). 
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specific training and lack the funding and resources to implement it,401 
some law enforcement agencies are beginning to provide it.402 
As for additional strategies to improve the interactions between police 
and youths of color, some of the preliminary work has already been done. 
Police accountability task forces have generated reports that acknowledge 
both explicit and implicit racial bias and offer proposals to promote trans-
parency, police accountability, and the investigation of patterns of police 
abuse within departments.403 The recent report of the task force that evalu-
ated the Chicago Police Department openly discusses the prevalence of rac-
ism within the force and the perception that police “approach every encoun-
ter with people of color as if the person, regardless of age, gender or cir-
cumstance, is a criminal.”404 Ensuring that voices of young people are heard 
and considered must be a critical part of the project. In this spirit, academics 
and researchers have chronicled the experiences of young Black people in 
routine encounters with police and offered policy, advocacy, and research 
agendas that address the issues the youths raised.405 The emphasis on the 
voices of youths has encouraged a more explicit focus on white privilege 
and strategies for eliminating it in the criminal justice system.406 Advocacy 
groups, such as the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and 
Justice, have focused on increasing trust between communities and the 
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criminal justice system, by making police aware of the disrespect with 
which they treat Black crime victims and their families, a phenomenon that 
only “increases the divide between police and communities of color.”407 Ul-
timately, all of these initiatives are intended to enable communities of color to 
build a more respectful, trusting, and constructive relationship with police. 
There are critics, however, who say that implicit bias training is merely 
the latest one-size-fits-all trend and that its wide-ranging effects on racial 
bias have not been supported by the data.408 For instance, one researcher has 
written, “But does implicit bias training reduce racial biases—and, if so, for 
how long? Do reductions in implicit bias translate into decreased racial dis-
parities in policing? These questions are critical for understanding the 
promise that implicit bias training holds for policing. Unfortunately, though, 
empirical support is lacking.”409 Other critics suggest that conducting train-
ing that conditions people, including police officers, to be aware and more 
cognizant of their implicit racial biases may actually result in inadvertently 
increasing those biases.410 Researchers have also asserted that implicit bias 
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training could potentially endanger police officers and the public by encour-
aging officers to hesitate in situations when they should use lethal force.411 
Some reformers contend that the focus should be on inoculating 
against racial bias rather than eradicating bias, which may be an impossible 
task. This involves the challenging project of changing policies and proce-
dures that exacerbate racial bias and implementing ones that make bias less 
likely. For instance, data collection, like that implemented by the San Fran-
cisco Public Defender, could be used to increase awareness among judges, 
prosecutors, and probation officers of how their own racial and ethnic bias-
es impact their decision making.412 In jurisdictions where this has occurred, 
institutional pressure has been brought to bear on those whose sentencing 
patterns reflect racial bias.413 As a result, there has been evidence of repent-
ance and a subsequent change in these patterns.414 
“Procedural justice training” for police has been proposed as an alterna-
tive (or a complement) to implicit bias training. Supported by social science 
research, procedural justice theory is premised on the notion that people are 
more likely to comply with law and policy when they believe that the proce-
                                                                                                                           
www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/11/02/rise-of-the-bias-busters-how-unconscious-bias-became-
silicon-valleys-newest-target/#525212bed2e2] (citing evidence that “hidden bias training may . . . 
backfire and cause more prejudiced behavior”). 
 411 See Tami Abdollah, Police Agencies Line Up to Learn About Unconscious Bias, POLICE-
ONE.COM (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.policeone.com/patrol-issues/articles/8415353-Police-agencies-
line-up-to-learn-about-unconscious-bias/ [https://perma.cc/Y7S7-63MM] (citing a social psychologist 
who has stated that more research is needed about this potential for implicit bias training to harm offic-
ers). 
 412 Maurice Chammah, Do Public Defenders Spend Less Time on Black Clients?, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (May 2, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/05/02/do-public-defenders-
spend-less-time-on-black-clients#.3vZ56yfvb [https://perma.cc/YW6N-GNR2] (discussing how 
data are used to bring attention to implicit bias by court actors). Public defenders can also provide 
concrete policy recommendations based on research and fact-finding. See TANYA E. COKE, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ELIMINATING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29–30 (2013), available at 
https://www.nacdl.org/reports/eliminatedisparity [https://perma.cc/4PL4-DFCV] (making sugges-
tions for criminal justice reform to address racial disparities); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF ALA., 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN ALABAMA: REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES 
IN ALABAMA, PART ONE 5–8, 46–48, 68, 109, 146 (2005) (providing various policy recommenda-
tions based on research and fact-finding). Public defense organizations also testify before policy-
makers to raise awareness of racial bias and disproportionate impact. See Christian Lassiter Pre-
sented Testimony on Stop & Frisk to the City Council, BRONX DEFENDERS: OUR NEWS (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/christian-lassiter-presented-testimony-on-stop-frisk-to-the-
city-council [https://perma.cc/4DRN-6UHM] (highlighting a public defender’s testimony to the 
New York City Council on the racially disproportionate consequences of stop and frisk measures). 
 413 See Adachi, supra note 387 (describing the implementation of bias training and practical 
safeguards to prevent racial bias by San Francisco public defenders); Chammah, supra note 412 
(reporting that a Black retired judge in Maryland studied his sentencing patterns, found evidence 
of racial bias, and resolved to change his practices). 
 414 Chammah, supra note 412. 
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dures used by decisionmakers are fair, unbiased, and efficient.415 This type of 
training typically has an educational component and a practice component: 
police officers are taught the concepts of procedural justice and then instruct-
ed via roleplaying and simulations how to convey to suspects or community 
members why they are taking particular actions.416 In theory, as long as the 
officer’s reasoning is objective and nonbiased, those affected will be more 
likely to accept the consequences without suspicion and resentment.417 
On the legislative level, some states have explored “racial impact 
laws,” beginning with Iowa in 2008.418 The concept of these laws is to fore-
cast the impact that proposed changes in a state’s criminal code will have on 
people of different races and ethnicities, similar to fiscal or environmental 
impact statements, and to provide lawmakers with an opportunity to amend 
                                                                                                                           
 415 See TYLER, supra note 43, at 24–27 (suggesting that people obey the law when the rules 
and procedures are consistent with their personal values and attitudes); Mark R. Fondacaro et al., 
Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Sciences, 
57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 976, 981–82 (2006) (arguing that procedural fairness plays a key role in 
people’s willingness to cooperate with a wide range of decisions); Jennifer L. Woolard et al., An-
ticipatory Injustice Among Adolescents: Age and Racial/Ethnic Differences in Perceived Unfair-
ness of the Justice System, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207, 221–25 (2008) (finding that greater propor-
tions of adolescents of color with no criminal justice system experience anticipate injustice than 
whites). 
 416 LEVIN WHELLER ET AL., COLL. OF POLICING, THE GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE TRAINING EXPERIMENT: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION SKILLS TRAINING 
ON OFFICERS AND VICTIMS OF CRIME 7–8 (2013) (depicting communicating training modules that 
included signposting, building rapport, and acknowledging the victim); Wesley G. Skogan et al., 
Training Police for Procedural Justice, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 319, 322–23 (2015) 
(illustrating Chicago Police’s training modules that emphasized both concepts of procedural jus-
tice and practice guidelines); Daniela Gilbert et al., California Partnership for Safe, Procedural 
Justice and Police Legitimacy: Using Training as a Foundation for Strengthening Community-Police 
Relationships 3–14 (Feb. 2015), available at https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/Procedural-Justice-and-
Police-Legitimacy-Paper-CPSC-Feb-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV48-RM5R] (working draft, lim-
ited distribution) (describing specific cases of procedural justice training and their impact). 
 417 See Adam Lamparello, Social Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical Foundations of 
Judgment: Importing the Procedural Justice Model to Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence, 38 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 115, 153 (2006) (concluding, based on empirical data, that people are 
more likely to accept outcomes if they believe the procedures to have been fair); Tom R. Tyler & 
Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their 
Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 260 (2008) (arguing that perceptions of procedural 
justice affect community members’ judgment of police legitimacy); Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 321–22 (2009) 
(suggesting that procedural justice can facilitate acceptance of decisions of legal authorities). 
 418 IOWA CODE § 2.56 (1) (2017) (requiring that any bill or amendment that proposes a 
change in a criminal law must include, inter alia, a statement addressing the impact of the legisla-
tion on minorities); Jessica Erickson, Comment, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Con-
sequences of Racial Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 
1446–47 (2014) (describing Iowa, Connecticut, and Oregon’s adoption of racial impact state-
ments). 
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the legislation as needed.419 Connecticut420 and Oregon421 have passed simi-
lar laws, and legislation in several other states has been introduced.422 In 
Minnesota, the sentencing commission regularly drafts racial impact state-
ments for new legislation, although it is not statutorily required.423 Such 
developments signal that politicians are increasingly recognizing that legis-
lation can have a disproportionate racial impact, a result that they, as elected 
officials, have a responsibility to avoid. 
Whether racial impact legislation or instruction in implicit bias, ado-
lescent development, or procedural justice theory will minimize the likeli-
hood of racialization remains to be seen. None of these strategies will work 
unless the various players recognize and appreciate the ways in which ra-
cialization is harmful. Although there may be resistance, the court culture 
must also allow for open discussion of the impact that racialization has on 
individual children as well as the community at large. 
2. Racial Diversification of Juvenile Court 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the strategies currently de-
ployed to eradicate the racialization of juvenile court may be promising but 
                                                                                                                           
 419 Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 1, 2014), http://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements/ [https://perma.cc/RHE5-3QFF]. 
 420 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-24 (b) (2015) (requiring a “racial and ethnic impact statement” for 
bills and amendments that increase or decrease the populations of Connecticut correctional facilities). 
 421 Act of July 1, 2013, ch. 600, § 4, Or. Laws 1–2 (requiring that all proposed criminal legis-
lation must include a racial and ethnic impact statement that describes the effects of the bill on 
juveniles or adult criminal defendants, and that the statement must be “impartial, simple and un-
derstandable” and must include data on how the bill would change the racial composition of the 
affected populations as well as its impact on the racial composition of crime victims); see also 
Dana Tims, Racial Impact Statements Will Help Oregon Lawmakers Evaluate Effect of Proposed 
Legislation on Minorities, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/
index.ssf/2014/09/racial_impact_statements_will.html [https://perma.cc/JA4V-H6LT] (describing 
the widespread support for the Oregon bill, which easily passed the state legislature). 
 422 Erickson, supra note 418, at 1450–55; Porter, supra note 419 (finding that legislators in 
Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin have introduced legislation to 
adopt racial impact statements). As of February 2016, Maryland, Washington, Illinois were debat-
ing adopting similar laws. State Advocacy Update: New Proposals to Challenge Racial Disparity 
in Criminal Justice System, SENTENCING PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.
org/news/state-advocacy-update-new-proposals-to-challenge-racial-disparity-in-criminal-justice-
system [https://perma.cc/S2EM-6C8J]. 
 423 See Erickson, supra note 418, at 1445–46; Maggie Clark, Should More States Require 
Racial Impact Statements for New Laws?, USA TODAY (July 31, 2013), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/07/31/racial-impact-statements-laws/2602563/ [https://perma.cc/Q8BQ-
YL5K] (stating that Minnesota uses racial impact statements); MINN. SECOND CHANCE COAL., 
RACIAL IMPACT STATEMENTS, available at http://www.mnsecondchancecoalition.org/pdf/racial_
impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/A874-SPNQ] (describing Minnesota’s use of racial impact statements 
of sentencing policies on felony offenses). 
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have yet to be fully realized. The bottom line is that racial bias will continue 
to proliferate within the legal profession as long as lawyers as a group are 
disproportionately white.424 The lack of Black and Latino attorneys and 
judges is significant in the juvenile court system, where the respondents are 
disproportionately children of color.425 Research has shown that people 
generally do not feel empathy for those whom they view as “social out-
group members” (typically defined as people of a different race or ethnicity) 
without active and deliberate effort.426 Psychologists have explained: 
People generally do not vicariously feel the emotional and moti-
vational states of those they categorize as outgroup members. . . . 
[T]he more prejudiced people are, the less likely they will intui-
tively catch the emotive states of outgroup members. This bias in 
emotional sharing could contribute to an empathy-gap, impairing 
the experience of empathy for outgroups, which is a capacity that 
underlies and facilitates social understanding and cooperation and 
fosters helping, morality, altruism and justice. Thus, when people 
fail to share the emotional and motivational states of outgroup 
members they might not be as responsive to outgroup members’ 
                                                                                                                           
 424 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 6 (finding that 88% of lawyers are white); HUMES ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 4 (finding that white people comprise 72% of the U.S. population); Standing 
Committee on Judicial Independence, supra note 5 (finding that 86% of state court judges are 
white); see also Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Diversity in the Legal Profession: Per-
spectives from Managing Partners and General Counsel, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2483, 2484–85 
(2015) (finding extreme racial and gender disparities among lawyers at law firms and in-house 
legal departments); Yolanda Young, Why the U.S. Needs Black Lawyers Even More Than It Needs 
Black Police, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/11/
why-the-us-needs-black-lawyers [http://web.archive.org/web/20170101232219/https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2015/may/11/why-the-us-needs-black-lawyers] (arguing that more black 
lawyers are needed in the area of criminal law as well as civil litigation, such as bankruptcy and 
employment discrimination, in which white attorneys were found to steer more black people into 
Chapter 13, rather than the less onerous Chapter 7, and to decide whether to reject a case based on 
perceived “demeanor and mannerisms,” which is often racially-coded). 
 425 See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the greater likelihood that Black 
and brown youth would be arrested and receive more punitive sanctions in juvenile court than 
white youth). 
 426 See Jennifer N. Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Intergroup Differences in the Sharing of Emo-
tive States: Neural Evidence of an Empathy Gap, 7 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI-
ENCE 596, 601–02 (2012) (finding that people generally do not experience empathy for outgroup 
members on the same intuitive basis that they do for ingroup members); see also Alessio Avenanti 
et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-Race Pain, 20 CUR-
RENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1020 (2010) (finding that although human beings react empathically to the 
pain of strangers, racial bias and stereotyping may lessen this reaction); Gutsell & Inzlicht, supra, 
at 596, 602 (defining “empathy” as the ability to share the emotions of another, which enables one 
person to gain an intuitive understanding of another, and noting that the effects of the “empathy 
gap” may be temporary and can be reduced by considering the perspective of the outgroup mem-
ber, which has been shown to reduce prejudice towards the outgroup). 
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needs and be less likely to help or even to understand that support 
is needed. This could be particularly true for people high in prej-
udice, opening the door for discrimination.427 
Therefore, if the “neural simulation”428 on which empathy is based is absent, 
a juvenile court judge’s instinctual response toward a child of a different race 
or ethnicity may be indifference, lack of understanding, or even hostility. 
Yet, this sort of empathy gap can also impact two people of the same 
race or ethnicity when one perceives the other to belong to an “outgroup,” 
resulting in intraracial indifference or discrimination.429 Because of this, the 
vision of racial diversification promoted here is not one that calls for same-
race “matching” of lawyers and clients or judges and clients,430 but for a 
racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse community that allows 
for the possibility of redefining and reimagining ingroups and outgroups. In 
short, when the percentage of people of color working in the juvenile court 
system reflects their presence in the community at large, the aspirational 
goal of breaking down stereotypes and changing social structures may be 
more realistic. In this way, policies calling for racial “matching” stand in 
stark contrast to the vision of a deracialized juvenile court promoted here. 
Another function of the stark racial imbalance between white lawyers 
and children of color in the juvenile justice system is that those making sub-
jective, multifactor decisions—judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys—
typically operate based on an underlying assumption of neutrality in white-
ness. This means that when a white judge decides whether a Black child 
should be released or detained, the calculus will be based on the personal 
values and norms of the judge without recognizing that whiteness is a par-
ticular racial identity that comes with its own set of values and norms that 
differ from those of non-whites.431 As a result, the racial bias inherent in the 
juvenile court system is rarely confronted (or even consciously acknowl-
                                                                                                                           
 427 Gutsell & Inzlicht, supra note 426, at 601 (citations omitted). 
 428 Id. at 596 (explaining that “[m]erely seeing others doing something or expressing their 
emotions engages the same neural networks necessary for the execution of the same behavior or 
the experience of the same emotions in the observer”). 
 429 Id. at 602 (cautioning against always categorizing ingroups and outgroups by race and 
explaining that outgroups may also be “culturally disliked groups that change from one society to 
the next”). 
 430 See, e.g., Raquel R. Cabral & Timothy B. Smith, Racial/Ethnic Matching of Clients and 
Therapists in Mental Health Services: A Meta-Analytic Review of Preferences, Perceptions, and 
Outcomes, 58 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 537, 547 (2011) (finding variability as to positive results 
of racial/ethnic matching of therapists and patients of the same race). 
 431 Pearce, supra note 384, at 2089–91 (discussing the fact that white lawyers, and judges, 
treat whiteness as a neutral norm or baseline, not a racial identity, causing them either to avoid 
issues of race or to defer to people of color whom they consider “experts” on race). 
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edged) by the overwhelmingly white group of decisionmakers because of 
their implicit assumption that whiteness is a neutral baseline.432 In this way, 
white people’s values and norms become the values and norms of the juve-
nile justice system and marginalize the values and norms of the “out-
group.”433 
The differential treatment of Black children in juvenile court is com-
pounded by the fact that there are also low percentages of Black people in 
many of the other professional disciplines that intersect with the juvenile 
court system. For instance, only 4% of practicing physicians are Black (alt-
hough Blacks comprise more than 13% of Americans overall),434 and only 
7% of Black students enroll in medical school.435 In the educational context, 
the differential treatment of Black children is exacerbated by the fact that 
African-American teachers remain significantly underrepresented in the 
United States.436 In addition, research has suggested that white teachers are 
more likely than Black teachers to perceive Black youths as disruptive, and 
white teachers have significantly lower academic attainment expectations of 
Black students than do Black teachers.437 A recent study of preschool-age 
youths found that because of implicit biases, educators of both races ex-
                                                                                                                           
 432 Id. 
 433 Id.; see also Coco Fusco, Fantasies of Oppositionality: Reflections on Recent Conferences 
in Boston and New York, 29 SCREEN 80, 91 (1988) (“Racial identities are not only black, Latino, 
Asian, Native American, and so on; they are also white. To ignore white ethnicity is to redouble 
its hegemony by naturalizing it. Without specifically addressing white ethnicity, there can be no 
critical evaluation of the construction of the other.”). 
 434 See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., DIVERSITY IN THE PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE: FACTS & 
FIGURES 2014, Section II (2014) (“Although blacks and African-Americans comprise 13 percent 
of the nation, they account for only 4 percent of the physician workforce.”); Dennis Thompson, 
Too Few Blacks, Hispanics Becoming Doctors: Study, HEALTHDAY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://consumer.healthday.com/general-health-information-16/doctor-news-206/too-few-blacks-
hispanics-are-becoming-doctors-study-702572.html [https://perma.cc/5G9M-DEFS] (citing a 2012 
study which found that “blacks made up just under 4 percent of practicing physicians, 6 percent of 
trainees in graduate medical education and 7 percent of medical school graduates”); see also Da-
mon Tweedy, Op-Ed, The Case for Black Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/05/17/opinion/sunday/the-case-for-black-doctors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
6JYJ-3HVU] (stating that African-Americans comprise only 5% of the medical profession). 
 435 See Liliana M. Garces & David Mickey-Pabello, Racial Diversity in the Medical Profes-
sion: The Impact of Affirmative Action Bans on Underrepresented Student of Color Matriculation 
in Medical Schools, 86 J. HIGHER EDUC. 264, 265 (2015) (noting that African Americans account-
ed for only 7% of total medical school enrollment in 2012). 
 436 See REBECCA GOLDRING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2011–12 SCHOOLS AND STAFFING SURVEY 3, 6 (2013) (finding that 
in 2011–12, 82% of all public school teachers were white). 
 437 Wright, supra note 248, at 4–6, 25 (finding that 16% of African-American students expe-
rienced an out-of-school suspension in the 2011–12 school year, compared with 5% of white stu-
dents and 7% of Hispanic students).  
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pected “challenging” behaviors from very young Black children, especially 
Black boys, at greater rates than white children; it also found that white 
teachers are more likely than Black teachers to escalate their disciplinary 
responses to Black children over time.438 The researchers hypothesized that 
Black teachers may be “better equipped to understand the needs of Black 
boys and that this understanding may lead to more culturally-aligned and 
effective early education pedagogy.”439 
The argument here, however, is not that diversification will be a pana-
cea for systemic racism. Much of the social science research indicates, in 
fact, that there is not a strong correlation, much less a causal connection, 
between, for instance, the race of a police officer and his treatment of a sus-
pect.440 Likewise, as discussed earlier,441 a person of one race may consider 
another person of the same race to be a member of an outgroup or may have 
adopted negative stereotypes about other members of their own racial 
group.442 Consistent with these findings, one study has found that only five 
percent of Blacks and Latinos believed that police officers in their neigh-
borhoods should be exclusively of the same race as the majority of their res-
idents, with the vast majority preferring to have mixed-race teams of offic-
ers on patrol.443 Statistics, however, are not predictive of individual behav-
ior; there are studies showing “some evidence of harsh treatment” toward 
Black citizens by Black officers444 as well as studies suggesting that Black 
officers working in Black neighborhoods are more supportive and respectful 
of the residents than white officers.445 
                                                                                                                           
 438 WALTER S. GILLIAM ET AL., YALE CHILD STUDY CTR., DO EARLY EDUCATORS’ IMPLICIT 
BIASES REGARDING SEX AND RACE RELATE TO BEHAVIOR EXPECTATIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF PRESCHOOL EXPULSIONS AND SUSPENSIONS? 2, 4, 11 (2016). 
 439 Id. at 4–5. 
 440 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FAIRNESS & EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 3 
(Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (“Among officer characteristics, neither race nor 
gender has a direct influence on the outcome of routine police-citizen encounters.”). 
 441 See supra notes 426–429 and accompanying text. 
 442 See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING IN BALTIMORE’S EASTERN 
DISTRICT 39–46 (2008) (discussing, in the context of a qualitative study of Baltimore’s Eastern 
District, the shared mentality of Black and white police officers toward the Black residents of the 
neighborhoods they patrol). 
 443 Ronald Weitzer, Diversity Among Police Officers Is Key, but It Won’t Solve the Problems 
with Policing, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/
jan/20/diversity-among-police-officers-is-key-but-it-wont-solve-the-problems-with-policing [https://
perma.cc/P6BP-FFJQ]. 
 444 Ivan Y. Sun & Brian K. Payne, Racial Differences in Resolving Conflicts: A Comparison 
Between Black and White Police Officers, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 516, 519 (2004) (citing studies 
from 1969 and 1984). 
 445 Id. at 519, 534–35; see also Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Of-
ficer Diversity and the Deadly Use of Police Forc, 2 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal The-
ory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-512, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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Despite these limitations in the data, a concerted effort should be made 
to racially diversify the juvenile court workplace, as well as the overwhelm-
ingly white legal profession, in order to create a culture in which all profes-
sionals strive to be fair and impartial in their decision making.446 This 
means that we should racially integrate overwhelmingly white professions 
that intersect with the juvenile court system—lawyers, judges, doctors, and 
teachers—as well as the fields of law enforcement, probation, and parole.447 
There is likely to be public support for such a goal, as evidence has shown, 
for instance, that a majority of Americans of all races believe that the racial 
composition of a police force should reflect the racial composition of the 
community.448 Diversity allows for the building of trust and confidence in 
an institution, and the more the racial and ethnic makeup of that institution 
reflects its community, the more likely it will have a reputation for fairness. 
In other words, a representative juvenile justice system can have symbolic 
benefits that help reduce the public perception that decisions, whether by 
prosecutors, judges, probation officers, or defense attorneys, are premised 
on racial bias. Admittedly, past efforts at a related goal—reducing dispro-
portionate minority representation of juveniles in the justice system—have 
been only marginally successful.449 Yet, the project of altering the complex 
factors that lead to disproportionate numbers of low-income Black children 
and families in juvenile court is more complex and ambitious than commit-
ting to training, recruiting, and hiring greater numbers of people of color 
throughout the system. In other words, racial integration of these subgroups 
                                                                                                                           
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778692 [https://perma.cc/CR44-SKHY] (arguing that “a diverse police 
force,” that proportionally represents the population it serves, “mitigates [perceived] group threat 
and thereby reduces the number of officer-involved killings”). 
 446 See Elizabeth Levy Paluck & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A 
Review and Assessment of Research and Practice, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 339, 352 (2009) (sug-
gesting that when people of different races are required to work or play cooperatively, the biased 
attitudes of all involved decline, and the decline remains consistent for long periods after the expe-
rience). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, DIVERSITY IN THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS (Cie Armstead ed., 2010) (addressing the urgent need to 
diversify the legal profession). 
 447 See NAZGOLD GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINAT-
ING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (2015) (discussing the need for 
police departments to recruit and retain people of color, as survey data suggest that Black officers 
are more sensitive to the problem of biased policing than white officers). 
 448 See Weitzer, supra note 443 (describing how a diverse police force can help build com-
munity trust in the police and decrease the sense that individuals are being stopped solely for their 
race). 
 449 See Ashley Nellis & Brad Richardson, Getting Beyond Failure: Promising Approaches for 
Reducing DMC, 8 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 266, 272–74 (2010) (“Although some modi-
cum of success toward eliminating [racial] disparities [in the juvenile justice system] has been 
observed, in many places, it still seems reluctant to even budge.”). 
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in an attempt to inoculate against bias is a more sustainable goal than eradi-
cating implicit bias, which requires fundamentally altering the negative way 
in which many people, regardless of their race, view low-income Black 
children and adolescents. 
CONCLUSION 
Recently I was in juvenile court when the judge spoke to a white boy 
who stood before him. The boy looked to be about fourteen or fifteen, and 
he was tall and thin with close-cropped brown hair. I did not know what the 
youth had been charged with, but the purpose of the hearing was for the 
judge to enter a disposition. The boy’s parents, who were also white, sat on 
the bench behind their son. The boy and his father wore matching blue 
blazers, white button-down shirts, dark slacks, and brown leather shoes. The 
boy’s mother wore a modest dress with a long coat. I thought I heard the 
father mention that he worked as an accountant. 
I was not paying close attention to the case until I heard the judge say 
clearly to the boy and his parents, who were all standing at this point, “You 
don’t belong here. You know that, right?” The boy nodded. “You’re not 
supposed to experience this,” the judge added, extending his hand in a way 
that took in the whole room, “but I am confident that it won’t happen again, 
and you will be able to move on.” I could not recall another occasion when 
the judge had so candidly expressed this type of sentiment to a youth in ju-
venile court. 
I felt myself discretely looking around the courtroom at all the black 
and brown faces—small children, teenagers, mothers, a couple of fathers, 
and several grandmothers and aunts. There were no other white kids there 
that morning. The judge and most of the probation officers and court offic-
ers were white. The prosecutor and defense attorneys were also white, in 
addition to the boy and his parents. Those sitting in the audience appeared 
to be listening, but no one seemed to blink when the judge made his com-
ments. As I glanced back over at the family, the judge and the parents began 
laughing at something together, as though sharing a joke, while the boy 
looked relieved. Then the case was done and the next matter was called. 
Since that day, I have thought more about the power of data and what 
could be accomplished if we were able to document every instance of the 
racialization of juvenile justice. We could then share it with all the court 
actors during roundtable discussions about implicit bias and the perpetua-
tion of negative racial stereotypes. We could brainstorm ways in which to 
avoid its use in the future, but would this make a difference? Would there be 
fewer instances of race-based subjective decision making or youths’ relin-
quishment of rights? Would there be less harm perpetrated on young people 
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and their families? Or are we so inured to the racism that permeates every 
aspect of the system that we are unable to tease out these specific instances 
in which racial bias manifests itself? Besides, even if we could identify ra-
cialized practices and attempt to neutralize their power, how much of a dif-
ference could this actually make, given the current racial makeup of the sys-
tem’s actors? Would there be a dramatic change in tenor and tone in the 
courtroom, judge’s chambers, and offices of the probation officer, prosecu-
tor, and public defender? Or should we focus on creating a more racially 
diverse juvenile court system in which more of the decisionmakers look like 
the children and families who have been disproportionately represented? In 
other words, might racial integration be the best chance for transformative 
change? 
Several days after the court appearance, a student who had been pre-
sent told me that her client, a twelve-year-old Black girl, had asked about 
the judge’s comments: “What did he mean that the white kid doesn’t belong 
here? He didn’t say that to me. Does that mean I do belong here?” The stu-
dent had tried to reassure her client that judges talk a lot at disposition and 
that the judge’s comments did not mean anything about her or her case. Re-
flecting on this exchange, I imagined that if we could at least rid the juve-
nile court system of egregious examples of racialization, like this one, there 
could indeed be progress. If we could also take steps to ensure that more 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys (as well as police and probation 
officers) are people of color, perhaps we would see a true shift in tone. With 
such a shift, the juvenile court experience, which itself is criminogenic, 
would be less likely to harm children and their families. 
  
 
